Battle of Homestead Site
National Historic Landmark Application

Location
(1) Homestead Steel Works wharf/landing site; (2) pump house for Homestead Steel Works; (3) water tower for Homestead Steel Works; (4) Five Piers for the Pittsburgh, McKeesport, and Youghiogheny Railroad Bridge connecting Munhall on the south bank of the Monongahela River and Swissvale on north bank

Current:
(1) Site has been filled over with slag up to the first floor level of the pump house. An almost 40-foot high concrete retaining wall, extending from the river level to first floor level of pump house, was built in 1941. The historic landing site is underneath the retaining wall and the slag fill. Wooden pilings, believed to have been part of the original wharf, have been recently observed at the base of the concrete wall.

(3) The water tower, though not in use for water storage, is a historic icon which serves as an aid in identifying with the 1892 labor/management confrontation.

Architectural Classification (1) & (7) N/A
(2) Industrial design by Carnegie Phipps & Co. Ltd., drawing No. 26, October 29, 1891; (3) Industrial design by Carnegie Steel Co. Ltd., drawing No. 32, July 28, 1892.

(1) The Pinkerton Landing Site was located in Mifflin Township (incorporated as the borough of Munhall in 1901), Allegheny County, on the south bank of the Monongahela River, approximately seven miles upstream from the city of Pittsburgh. It was the northernmost point of the vast 90-acre Homestead Steel Works. The landing site was at the base of a steep slope that consisted of three primary levels composed of slag and cinder: the upper level was relatively flat at essentially the same elevation of the first floor of the pump house which had recently been built into the slope; the next level extended from the mill level at a forty-five degree angle to the base of the pump house, where a lightweight rail line which ran along the slope connected with a similar rail line which ran along the bottom, just above the river level.

Wooden pilings were located at the water's edge for slope stabilization and to facilitate the docking of vessels. The pilings extended a long distance along the edge of the river, as evidenced in historic photographs taken at the time.[1] The western most end of the landing was in a direct

[1] Randolph Harris, "Photographers at Homestead in 1892," in David P. Demarest, Jr., General Editor; Fannia Weingartner, Coordinating Editor. "The River Ran Red;" Homestead 1892 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 96-97, 160-161. Mr. Harris was, until recently, the photo archivist and community organizer for the Steel Industry Heritage Corporation, Homestead, Pennsylvania. The photograph which became a symbol of the Pinkertons' defeat was taken by prominent Pittsburgh photographer Benjamin L.H. Dabbs. The photograph, taken from the north bank of the Monongahela River in Swissvale, shows the landing site along with the pump house and a large portion of the Homestead Steel Works. The timing of the photograph is after the Pinkertons had surrendered and the barges had been set on fire. This photograph shows the pilings extending a considerable distance up and down the river.

line with the eastern end of the pump house. A cut in the steep slope provided access between the landing and the mill yard at a point near the upriver end of the pump house. It was through this cut that the Pinkertons were led up the slope after their surrender about 6:00 pm on July 6, 1892.

While the historic drawings make the wharf/landing site appear extensive, in reality it was as a New York Herald reporter wrote, a "little landing."[2] Although there had been a simple wharf constructed of "piles and old ties" at this site as early as 1883,[3] a landing at this location was not critical to the operation of Homestead Steel Works, because most of the movement or raw materials and the finished product was by rail.

The landing site of 1892 was covered over before 1911 by slag fill and the construction of a wall of unidentified construction, bringing the area between the river and the north side of the pump house up to the general level of the Homestead Steel Works. The existing concrete river wall dates to 1941.[4] While the original appearance of the 1892 landing site is no longer visible, it is strongly believed that the site still exists underneath all of the fill, based upon the recent discovery of pilings where historic photographs suggest where they likely would have been located in 1892.[5] The site still retains strong historical associational values.

(2)Pump House #1. The pump house as the time of the July 6 battle was still relatively new; it had been designed in late October 1891, but the machinery had not yet been installed.[6] It was a vital component of the water system which provided the 7,000,000 gallons of water per day needed for mill operations.[7] Featured prominently in the photographs and drawings relating the historic event, the pump house, though altered from its original appearance, continues to be a strong visual reminder of the events of July 6, 1892. It was designed with carefully proportioned features, with details from Classical architecture.[8] The building was constructed of a reddish brown, crudely shaped, common brick with wide joints pointed with grayish-tan mortar, with visible particles of coal or cinders. It was built with three bays of two arched window openings in each of the two long sides, and four arched windows in each of the shorter gable ends. The original structure measured 42 feet long and 37 feet wide. The most unusual feature of the pump house was its very deep foundation. Even in 1892, the main level was very modest compared

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[2] *New York Herald*, July 7, 1892 in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 77.

[3] Charles H. Uhl, "Draft Historic Structures Report, Pump House and Water Tower/1892 Pinkerton Landing Site" (Pittsburgh: Historic Preservation Services, 1995), 5.

[4] Uhl, "Draft Historic Structures Report," 21.

[5]August Carlino, Interview with John W. Bond, March 20, 1995. Mr. Carlino is the Executive Director, Steel Industry Heritage Corporation, Homestead, Pennsylvania; telephone conversation between Charles H. Uhl, Historic Preservation Services, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and John W. Bond, July 14, 1995.

[6]Charles Mansfield, Testimony, July 14, 1892, U.S. House of Representatives Report No. 2447, February 1893, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 82.

[7]Harry B. Latton, "Steel Wonders, " *The Pittsburgh Times*, June 1, 1892, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red*," 13.

[8] Uhl, "Draft Historic Structures Report," 10.

with the almost forty vertical feet below that level, with the floor of the pump room being only slightly above the level of the Monongahela River. Today, all but the main level is underground. When constructed, the pump house connected with the river by the installation of twenty-inch intake pipes laid in a trench cut through the 1883 river landing. Water for the operation of the mills was brought through the pump house and pumped to the nearby water tower which distributed water to the works. From the level of the intake pipes, four stepped tiers of concrete substructure integrated with the visible brick structure to provide the building's unusual foundation, so prominent in photographs and drawings of the period.

The south elevation (land-facing) of the main level differed from the north (river-facing) side by the placement of a six-foot wide round arched door opening in the center bay. All of the other bays on the long sides had two tall round arched 9/9 double hung windows framed by a simple entablature of brick pilasters. The east and west elevations were framed by brick pilasters and a two-step corbelled brick cornice following the gable.

The roof of the 1892 pump house was constructed of wooden trusses and sheathing and covered with slate. In 1944 this roof was replaced with steel trusses supporting corrugated asbestos sheets, the present roof covering.

The pump house was doubled in size in 1898, with the addition mirroring the 1892 structure, including the pump room level. In the interior of the main level, the southern window of the original eastern wall was converted to a door to connect the two sections. The 1898 addition had a steel truss system and apparently had a slate roof.[9] The 1898 extension, representing a doubling of the 1892 building in all respects, and a total integration of the functions of the two sections, is regarded as contributing to the historic setting. Because of the structural integration of the 1892 and 1898 portions, it is not practical to remove the 1898 addition be retained.[10]

Besides the various additions made over many years, the most apparent change has been the infilling with brick all of the masonry openings, replacing the original windows with small rectangular aluminum-sashed windows. The original placement of the windows and doors is quite apparent upon visually inspecting the building and comparing what is there today with historic photographs. The 1892-1898 architectural character of the building is still discernible in the two main sections of the pump house.

The walls of the pump house appear to be sound and straight on their deep foundation. "Nineteenth century components of the surviving pump house include sections of brick, mortar, and cast iron window sills. The brick and mortar vary from good to poor condition. Uncontrolled water run-off has deteriorated brick and mortar in several locations."[11] Overall, the building is in stable condition.

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[9] *Ibid.,* 12.

[10] *Ibid.,* 26.

[11] *Ibid.,* 19

(3) Water Tower. Plans for the existing water tower were dated July 28, 1892, during the lockout/strike. The structure was completed in 1893. The first section consists of an octagonal red brick base twenty-three feet high on a concrete substructure. Terra cotta coping was used to cap the base. Each of the eight sides of the base is framed on the sides and top by stepped-out brick entablature. Every other wall section has an arched masonry opening filled with a steel plate door with riveted strap hinges set flush in a steel jamb. Two brick walls pass through the octagonal base to provide support for the 3/4" thick steel plated bottom of the water tank. The original water tank, forty feet tall and forty feet in diameter, was made up of eight five-foot high rings of iron, riveted together. Each ring has thirteen ten-foot sections. The tank has never had a top.

Two additional five-foot rings were added to the tank in 1912, bringing the height of the tank to fifty feet and the total height of the structure to seventy-three feet. An open set of steel stairs was attached to the tank's southern side in 1913. The tank and stairs are painted black.

The condition of the brick base of the water tower is generally good. Some deterioration exists in the bottom few courses of brick due to splashing water runoff. The tank is, for the most part, in good condition, except the top two bands which have deteriorated from rust.

While the existing water tower was designed during the lockout/strike, but not built until 1893, it is regarded as contributing for National Historic Landmark nomination for the following reasons: At an early date, it replaced a water tower, consisting of two wooden tanks, which featured prominently in the events of July 6, 1892, and the iconography connected with the events of that day; it is functionally a companion to the pump house, part of which existed at the time of the battle; the age of the structure and the nature of its design warrant its consideration as a historic structure in its own right.[12]

SUMMARY

The bloody confrontation on July 6, 1892, between an industrial giant of world proportions and one of America's strongest labor unions was known at the time and until today as the Battle of Homestead. The Battle raged around the Homestead Steel Works of the Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, located on the southern bank of the Monongahela River in Mifflin Township, Pennsylvania, seven miles upstream from Pittsburgh. The mill was situated just over the boundary between Mifflin Township and the Borough of Homestead. Participants in this world-wide news event[13] were 280 members of Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers and Steel Workers and the remainder of Steel Work's total labor force of 3,800, most of whom were non-union, and 300 guards from the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, hired by the company to protect the property and those workers which the company planned to hire as strikebreakers.

While trouble between the union and the steel company had existed from the time Andrew Carnegie had acquired in 1883, the earlier company, the Pittsburgh Bessemer Company, it

[12]Uhl, "Draft Historic Structures Report," 26.
[13] Russell W. Gibbons, "Dateline Homestead," in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 158-159.

escalated to a lockout/strike in 1889 and to the more serious lockout/strike during the last two days of June, 1892. It had become increasingly obvious that a major showdown between the world's largest steel company and one of the country's most powerful union was imminent. The union considered the 1889 settlement a victory for the skilled workers and fully expected that a renewal of the contract at the end of June 1892, would result in a similar victory through negotiations between the union and the company. The company, under new leadership of Henry Clay Frick, known as the "most implacable foe of organized labor within the industry," was determined that the union would not win in 1892, as Frick's predecessor William Abbott had allowed in 1889.[14]

With the retirement of Abbott in April 1892, Frick became the head of Carnegie, Phipps & Company, which operated the Homestead Steel Works, while retaining his position as chairman of Carnegie Brothers & Company. When the long planned merger of these two companies occurred and Carnegie Steel Company, Limited came into being on July 1, 1892, Henry Clay Frick was chosen to be the chairman of the reorganized steel giant, "the largest steel company in the world, capable of producing more than half of the total steel production of Great Britain. The flagship of this fleet of steel plants, iron mills and blast furnaces was the … plant at Homestead." In 1886, only three years after acquiring the Homestead plant of The Pittsburgh Bessemer Company, Carnegie Brothers and Company, consisting of Andrew Carnegie and his brother Thomas, and other partners, converted the Homestead plant into an open hearth mill. At the time of the battle, the Homestead plant was "America's largest open hearth steel mill."[15]

In the early morning hours of July 6, 1892, the anticipated clash between labor and capital became a reality when 300 Pinkerton guards attempted to land at the wharf at the foot on which pump house #1 was located. What followed was approximately twelve hours of off and on fighting between the workers and the Pinkertons. The Pinkertons who had been stranded on two barges throughout the day were allowed to surrender about six o'clock that evening, but then were subjected to having to run a gauntlet of attackers as they were moved to temporary jails. While the fatalities, amounting to seven workers and three Pinker tons were numerous considering the extent of the fighting, the trauma of the event was so profound the message it carried to other workers and to people in general in this country and abroad was so provoking that it made headlines in the major papers and was a major topic talked about in the churches and in the halls of government.

The workers experienced victory on July 6. But, their victory was short-lived, because on July 12 the Pennsylvania National Guard came to Homestead, assuming total control over the area and staying until October of that year. In the meantime the company had reopened, with the protection of the military, and workers were becoming destitute from lack of income. The major defeat for the workers came on November 21, when they agreed to return to work on company terms, the most devastating one being that they could not belong to a union.[16]

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[14]Joseph Frazier Wall, "Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike," in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 4-5; Joseph Frazier Wall, Andrew Carnegie (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989. Originally published by Oxford University Press, 1970), 539 Demarest, "The River Ran Red," vii-viii.

[15]Wall, "Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike," in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 4.

[16]The New York Times, November 22, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 189.

The long range consequences of the lockout/strike and the Battle of Homestead were the demise of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers at Homestead and the virtual halting of unionism in the national steel industry for almost forty-five years.[17] It also meant total control by the owners of the work place, including working conditions to which the workers were subjected. Because of the level of company control, the townspeople's civil liberties and their influence upon local government were sharply curtailed.[18] When Carnegie Steel Company, Limited was purchased by J. P. Morgan in 1901, and U.S. Steel was created, there was no improvement for the workers. The steelworkers would not regain their collective bargaining rights for over four decades until the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 and the establishment of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee the following year (SWOC). In late 1936, through efforts of SWOC, the first lodge of the Amalgamated to be chartered since it had been abandoned in Homestead in 1892, was called to order in the SWOC hall on East Eighth Avenue in Homestead. On March 2, 1937, an agreement was signed by John L. Lewis and Philip Murray of the recently formed Committee for Industrial Organization, and U.S. Steel, making the Homestead Works once again unionized.[19]

HISTORY

The seemingly inevitable clash of July 6, 1892, and the preceding lockout by the managers of the Homestead Steel Works on June 29-30 and the strike by 3,800 workers on June 30, represented the culmination of capital/labor tension which had existed at the Homestead plant since 1882. In January of the year, members of the young, but powerful, Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steelworkers struck the Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company, which had been formed in 1879 by Andrew Kloman and partners.[20] It was with the 1883 purchase of the PBSC mill, which had been opened in 1881, that Carnegie Brothers & Company, Limited, bought out its chief rival and started its production of steel at what became known as the Homestead Steel Works. The earlier

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[17]Paul Krause, The Battle of Homestead, 1880-1892: Politics, Culture, and Steel (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 4.

[18] David Montgomery, "Afterword," in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 226-227.

[19]Russell W. Gibbons, "SWOC and the Homestead Legaxy," in Demarest, " The River Ran Red," 216. Also see Robert H. Zieger, American Workers, American Unions (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994, Second Edition), 44-55 for discussion of the work of the Committee for Industrial Organization and the organizing efforts of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC). The Committee for Industrial Organization became the Congress of Industrial Organizations at its first convention at Pittsburgh, November 14-18, 1938. See Encyclopedia Britannica (Chicago, London, Toronto: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1955), vol. 6. p. 254.

[20] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,"* 168, 179. In December 1870 Andrew and Thomas Carnegie formed a partnership with Andrew Kloman and Henry Phipps, Jr. to create the new company of Carnegie, Kloman & Company, for the purpose of constructing the Lucy Furnace at 51st Street in Pittsburgh. See, Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 355-360. By 1875 Kloman was out of the partnership and would by1879 form a new company for manufacture of steel, Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company, as a rival to Carnegie's Edgar Thomson Steel Works. Carnegie Brothers & Company, Limited, was formally organized in April 1881. Also see, Muller, "Draft Discussion of Homestead National Historic Landmarks," 4; Mark Brown, "Draft, Homestead Steel Works and Carrie Furnaces, Homestead, Pennsylvania: Inventory of Historic Structures and their Significance." (Washington, D.C.: Historic American Engineering Record, National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1990), 1.

Carnegie Company, Carnegie, McCandless & Company, had opened its first steel mill at the Edgar Thomson Steel Works in Braddock, Pennsylvania in 1875, where it specialized in the production of steel rails.[21]

The steelworkers' union had been founded as the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers of the United States in Pittsburgh on August 4, 1876, with the consolidation of three unions which had not been particularly successful representing iron and steel workers as individual unions.[22] Members of the new union represented skilled workers, while unskilled workers who belonged to a union were represented by the Knights of Labor. By June of 1881, the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers ("United States" had been dropped from the name) organized Munhall Lodge No. 24 and almost immediately called a strike against the company which had begun actual operations just that spring. The strike was short-lived, with workers giving in to demands of William Clark, the general manager and co-owner of Pittsburgh Steel Works.[23] By early October 1881, a second lodge, Homestead Lodge No. 11, had been formed. The union's strength was made evident when the contract came up for renewal at the end of December. At that time, Clark informed the workers that they had to sign an ironclad agreement which prohibited, for one thing, membership in the AAISW. Refusal to sign would result in dismissal. What followed was a three-month strike beginning January 1, 1882, when virtually the entire skilled work force of two hundred men refused to sign. "At stake for both sides was the answer to a specific question: Who would control the Homestead mill and moreover the entire Bessemer industry, labor or management?[24] By 1892 this question would be one of paramount importance. The 1882 strike ended on March 20 with a victory for the union; "within weeks the AAISW … [had] virtual possession of the mill." The steelworkers had "legitimized their right to control condition on the shop floor, and they had also earned respect in the arena of municipal government."[25]

The labor/capital relationship that Andrew Carnegie and his partners inherited when they purchased Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company in 1883, was one which would haunt Carnegie for years, especially between that time and July 1892. Apparently, he got more than he had bargained for:

> At little more than its original cost, he not only acquired the industry's most modern and efficiently designed rail and beam rolling mills, but he also got six highly organized and well-disciplined labor lodges of the powerful Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers.[26]

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[21]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 318-324.

[22]Sharon Trusilo, "Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers," in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red*," 16-17. The name of the union was later shortened by dropping "United States."

[23]Krause, *The Battle of Homestead*, 174.
[24]Ibid., 178.

[25]Ibid. 191-192.

[26]Wall, "Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike," in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,*" 4.

When Andrew Carnegie dedicated the Carnegie Library of Homestead in November 1898 he reminded his audience, even then, of his perception of the type of employees he picked up when he bought the Homestead plant:

> Many of you remember that we did not build these works; we did not man them; on the contrary we purchased them as a running concern form some of our neighbors, who had been compelled to employ any kind of men, such was the scarcity of labor at the time they started. If I may be allowed to say so, they were not such men as we have been blessed with at our works, and such as we now rejoice in having here.[27]

The manner, in which Andrew Carnegie dealt with unions, particularly at the Edgar Thomson mill in 1888 and at the Homestead Steel Works in 1889 and in 1892, appeared altogether contrary to what he said in his writings. In 1886 he published two essays in which he defended unionism and faulted employers for contributing to industrial unrest. While criticizing workers for their role in disturbances of that year, at the same time he declared that the "'right of workingmen to combine and form trade-unions is … sacred.' " He went on to say that union opposition to nonunion labor was justified and that employers need observe the first union commandment: "'Thou shalt not take thy neighbor's job.' "[28] His writings, particularly those in Forum magazine, brought him recognition as a defender of the rights of organized labor, for while stressing the remarkable advances labor in the United States had made in moving from serfdom to a position of "equal terms with the purchase of his labor," Carnegie said that the worker should be able to withhold or sell his services as it may seem best to him, making him a negotiator which would allow him to rise to the "dignity of an independent contractor."[29] Writings such as these delighted workers and their union leaders, but infuriated many of Carnegie's colleagues, such as Henry Clay Frick.

Workers would come to ask why Andrew Carnegie's actions did not support what he had said in his writings. Carnegie's award winning biographer, Joseph Frazier Wall, explains it as part of Andrew Carnegie's complex personality. Part of it, says Wall, "lies in Carnegie's vanity, in his desire to be loved and admired by all Americans." Another part of the puzzle may possibly be explained by his being convinced that "an enlightened labor policy was good business practice, that his two basic desires, to make money and to be a kind and good employer, were not antithetical, but rather complementary."[30] In dealing with Carnegie, there was the puzzle of which side of his personality would prevail. Would it be the Carnegie who wanted to be loved, or the Carnegie who wanted to be powerful, aggressive, hard-headed businessman?[31] It is necessary to recognize these two sides of Carnegie's personality in order to comprehend what happened over the years in his dealing with labor.

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[27]Andrew Carnegie, Dedication of the Carnegie Library of Homestead, November 5, 1898. Carnegie Library File, 8.

[28]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 233-234.
[29]Wall, Andrew *Carnegie,* 522-523.

[30]Wall, Andrew *Carnegie,* 522.

[31]Wall, "Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike, "in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red*," 5.

Henry Clay Frick, on the other hand, was much easier to predict. By 1892 there was industry-wide recognition that Frick was "the most implacable fore of organized labor … a reputation which he had deservedly earned in the coal fields of Pennsylvania."[32] Altogether in 1892, the Frick Company, of which Carnegie Brothers & Company owned half interest, held 35,000 acres of some of Pennsylvania's richest coal lands and 10,000 coke ovens.[33] Frick's managerial abilities and his business sense had long been recognized by Andrew Carnegie. Formal acknowledgement of that recognition came with Frick being allowed in 1887 to buy an interest in two Carnegie enterprises: Carnegie Brothers and Company, which operated Edgar Thomson Steel Works, among others, and Carnegie, Phipps & Company, which operated the Homestead Steel Works. In January 1889 he was further recognized by his appointment to the position of president of Carnegie Brothers.[34]

While Carnegie was recognizing Frick's abilities, Frick was not enamored with the support Carnegie had given labor in his Forum magazine articles. Particularly disconcerting to Frick was Carnegie's forcing him to settle in labor's favor a dispute between the Frick Coke Company and its workers in the spring of 1887. Carnegie was putting into practice the pro-labor sentiment he had expressed in his writings, while at the same time he was doing what he though was best to guarantee the maintenance of steel profits. In doing so, Carnegie temporarily lost Frick's services to the company and permanently acquired Frick's distrust.[35]

Carnegie's labor policies were more directly tested at the Edgar Thomson Steel Works in 1888. By the end of 1887, Carnegie became convinced that the eight-hour work day which is E.T. manager, Captain William R. Jones, had persuaded him to adopt in 1877, was no longer affordable. Accordingly, he ordered Jones to announce that starting January 1, 1888, the E.T. Works would put into practice the industry-wide standard two-turn, twelve hour shift. The workers immediately went on strike and Carnegie closed the mill.[36] Carnegie reopened with non-union workers and enough Pinkerton guards to protect them. He told his former employees, who ceased to be regarded as employees once they went on strike, that if they wanted to return to work, they would have to sign an ironclad agreement that barred membership in the union, which at E.T. was the Knights of Labor. The agreement required the workers to accept a return to the

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[32] Ibid. Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 521. Wall stresses the distinction between Frick and Carnegie when it came to labor policy. As Wall notes, "No one could ever accuse Frick of hypocrisy in regard to labor policy. No talk from him on the inalienable rights of labor to organize in order to protect jobs, no softness on the eight-hour day, no backing down in a strike situation. Even in the notoriously antilabor coal fields of Connellsville, Frick was known as a tough man who brooked no nonsense from labor organizers."

[33] *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly*, July 14, 1892 in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 6. Also see, Eugene Levy, "The Coke Region," in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 8-9.

[34] Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 497; Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly, July 14, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 6.

[35] Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 526-527. Frick temporarily resigned in May 1887 from the presidency of the Frick Coke Company, of which Carnegie was a major owner.

[36] Ibid.

twelve-hour day with a sliding wage scale, which would link the steelworkers' piece rate to the fluctuating market price of steel. In May 1888 Carnegie visited E. T. and personally presented his plan to the workers. The next day a thousand workers voted by secret ballot to accept the twelve-hour day and the sliding wage scale. Carnegie got what he had been wanting. With the union's capitulation to Carnegie's demands, unionism at the Edgar Thomson Works effectively ended.[37]

"Carnegie celebrated his victory in Braddock by giving his repentant workers a library and calling it a monument to his partnership with them."[38] In his March 30, 1889 dedication of the Carnegie Library of Braddock, Carnegie addressed himself as a "fellow workman." He told his audience:

> I have said how desirable it was that we should endeavor, by every means in our power, to bring about a feeling of mutuality and partnership between the employer and eth employed. Believe me, fellow workmen, the interests of Capital and Labor are one.

During his remarks he quoted extensively from an earlier article, presumably one appearing in Forum magazine in 1886, to emphasize the importance he attached to the sliding scale way of paying workers in proportion to the net prices received for product month by month. His article had concluded: "It is impossible for Capital to defraud Labor under a sliding scale." He reminded the E.T. workers in the audience that they were under the sliding scale at that time and that now Capital and Labor at E.T. were practically partners, sharing alike in the rise and fall of prices. No longer were they antagonists who had to quarrel every year upon the subject of wages. Carnegie firmly stated that he had rather retire from business altogether than return to the old system. "As far as I am concerned," he said, I will never have anything to do with manufacturing unless Labor is given a sliding scale."

Carnegie raised the subject of doing something for Homestead, with reference to a letter he had recently received on the subject. "Do something for Homestead," he said,

> Well, we have expected for a long time, but so far in vain, that Homestead should do something for us. But I do wish to do something for Homestead. I should like to see a Co-operative Society formed there. I should like to see a library there. I hope one day I may have the privilege of erecting at Homestead such a building as you have here; but this letter compels me now to say that our works at Homestead are not to us as our works at Edgar Thomson. Our men there are not partners …. When the labor in the Homestead works, like the labor in the Edgar Thomson, goes hand in hand with us as partners, I trust that able men will come forward and establish their Co-operative Society … I am only too anxious to do for them what I have done for you … I know of no use so just as to apply my wealth for the benefit of the men who have done so much to produce it. This I

[37]Krause, *The Battle of Homestead,* 235-237; Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 528

[38]Krause, *The Battle of Homestead,*237

> gladly promise. – The first dollar, or first hundred thousand dollars I receive from Homestead will be devoted to the building of such as this.[39]

It would be almost a decade before Homestead would receive a Carnegie Library. In the meantime, much would happen at the Homestead Works to prolong the struggle between labor and capital. Less than two months after Carnegie dedicated the Braddock Library, he announced on May 18 that the contract with the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers which was scheduled for renewal on June 30 would be on the basis of a sliding scale, with the minimum price per ton of steel billets being $25, rather than the existing tonnage basis. The skilled tonnage men were quite concerned because they had benefited greatly from the increased production due to the recent mechanical innovations made at Homestead. The sliding scale would result in a substantial wage reduction for them. While concerned about the reduction in wages, the workers were more concerned with the provision that "men desirous of employment will be required to sign an agreement." It was well understood by the workers that the "signing of an agreement" meant individual contracts between workers and management and the exclusion of the union from its bargaining position.[40] While Carnegie's announcement made no specific mention of either the AAISW, representing skilled workers, or the Knights of Labor, representing skilled workers, or the Knights of Labor, representing laborers, his decision was clear that all positions in the mill would become vacant as of June 1 and that all workers would have to reapply for work and sign the three year iron-clad contracts. The new contract would expire in January, not June. The union was determined to fight all aspects of the proposal.[41]

On June 27 Homestead steelworkers unanimously agreed not to accept Carnegie's proposal. This was done over the strenuous objections of William Weihe and William Martin, respectively the national president and secretary of the AAISW. The Knights of Labor undertook an organizational drive to increase their membership, making certain that Slavic workers were included in whatever union action was taken. With the workers strike, the company shut down the mill on July 1. At that time the steelworkers "decided to move just as they had in 1882; they took possession of the town and sealed it off. Directed by the paramilitary Advisory Committee of men chosen from each AAISW lodge, armed steelworkers guarded all approaches to the town." All was calm until July 10, when it was learned that one hundred Pinkerton guards had arrived in Pittsburgh and would be coming to Homestead to protect the scabs who would be coming to take the place of the striking workers. The Pinkertons did not come, but a train carrying thirty-one replacement workers, under the escort of the Allegheny County Sheriff, did arrive. The scabs (strikebreakers) had come as a result of action taken by William Abbott, president of Carnegie, Phipps, & Company, disregarding Carnegie's orders: "Homestead is settled. No use fighting there. If it never runs it will not start except with rates it can run upon steadily and compete with others."[42]

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[39]Andrew Carnegie, Dedication of the Carnegie Library at Braddock, March 30, 1889, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 1-2.

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[41]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 241-242.
[42]Wall, "*Andrew Carnegie"* 529

When the train arrived in Homestead, it was greeted by nearly two thousand Homesteaders, who formed a barrier between the train and the steel works. Most of those leaving the train hurriedly ran into the woods. Three scabs and an unemployment agent were assaulted physically. On July 12, the sheriff returned to Homestead, bringing with him 125 deputies and an order banning the workers from congregating on Carnegie, Phipps, and Company property. Three thousand Homesteaders prevented the sheriff from moving. "Homestead was on the verge of a riot." By late afternoon all of the deputies, except one, had returned to Pittsburgh.[43]

Abbott became panicky while dealing with the first major strike situation under his presidency. Fearing that he was facing violence at Homestead and a mass walkout throughout all of the Carnegie plants, Abbott capitulated. At a meeting at company offices in Pittsburgh between Abbott and other company officials and Hugh O'Donnell and a group of steelworkers from Homestead, an agreement was reached. While the agreement was regarded as a "compromise," the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers came out the victor. The AAISW accepted the sliding scale and was formally recognized as the sole bargaining agent for Homestead. A new contract was signed; it was to last for three years, expiring on July 1, 1892. The night following the signing on July 14, everyone in Homestead celebrated the union's victory. Even though it had accepted the sliding scale, "the union was more strongly entrenched than ever before. Because it was now accepted as the only bargaining agent with management, not a man could be hired or fired at Homestead without the union's approval."[44]

The union victory had meaning for the town of Homestead as well as for the workers on the job. Andrew Carnegie, in the assessment of Historian Paul Krause, had "also given the town the opportunity to realize its solidarity as a defiant workers' republic, united beyond differences of skill or ethnic background in the name of labor." Just as "'the mastery' of the steel lay squarely in the hands of union men, one year later, the town's government, too, would lie squarely in the hands of the union."[45] These would be critically important factors when the next major confrontation between labor and capital would occur. Not only would the union receive it greatest challenge; the town of Homestead, which had been since the early 1880s a model of "participatory, workers' democracy, would see that position seriously threatened and eventually destroyed by the company."[46]

Andrew Carnegie was pleased that the sliding scale was agreed to by the union. He was less than pleased, however, with the overall provisions of the settlement, as he wrote to his company president from his vacation site in Britain:

> The great objection to the compromise is of course that it was made under intimidation—our men in other works will now know that we will 'confer' with law breakers. At this distance one can be very brave no doubt, [but] I don't like this feature at all. Seems to me a curt refusal to have anything to do with these men would have brought matters right in less time than to you seems possible. Whenever we are compelled to make a stand we

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[43]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 247.

[44]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 530

[45]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead, 249.*

[46]Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* viii.

> shall have to shut down and wait as at E. T. until part of the men vote to work, then it is easy. I am glad however we have three years of peace under sliding scale.[47]

The 1889 strike/lockout was a forerunner of what would happen three years hence. Both management and labor look back to that event as they dealt with a similar, but more drastic, situation in July 1892.

As time for expiration of the three-year contract approached, the union was confident it could get the same contract renewed, based upon the victory it had scored in the 1889 agreement. The union thought that since it had done so well in 1889 and had such a high level of control over what happened in the mills that it would be able to negotiate for a favorable settlement. Furthermore, the company was in no position to have a work stoppage, so thought John McLuckie, member of the AAISW and the burgess of Homestead. McLuckie was thinking of the large contracts which the Homestead Works had for architectural ironwork to be used in the World's Fair buildings in Chicago and the furnishing of ten miles of elevated railway for the Fair.[48] At the time, Homestead Steel Works was also fulfilling a $4 million contract from the U. S. Navy for armor plate.[49] The alloyed steel armor plate produced at the Homestead Works would make the United States the world's leading naval power. "The Homestead Works were a technological wonder of the time . . . boasting an output 50 percent higher than any other mill in the world." It was through the use of technological advances at the Homestead mill that Andrew Carnegie and Henry Clay Frick hoped to reduce the need for skilled workers, with the ultimate goal of eliminating the union.[50] The Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers had not objected to technological improvements, even if it meant the loss of jobs. According to William Weihe, President of the AAISW, "the object and motive of the association has been for years to get the cost of labor as nearly uniform as possible, where the work is similar."[51] Thus, Carnegie's charge that "Amalgamated rules" forced the company to keep "far too many men" was basically unfair.[52]

It soon became unquestionable clear to the union that it was no longer dealing with a panicky William Abbott. There would be no such thing as negotiating as far as the new manager of the Homestead Steel Works, Henry Clay Frick, was concerned. Frick, who had been given control of Carnegie, Phipps & Company, operator of the Homestead Works, upon the retirement of Abbott

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[47]Wall, Andrew *Carnegie,* 530

[48]John McLuckie, Interview in *The World,* July 3, 1892. In Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,"* 56

[49]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 285.

[50]Charles C. McCollester, "Technological Change and Workers' Control at Homestead," in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 19-20.

[51]William Weihe, *U.S. Senate Report No. 1280,* testimony given November 24, 1892, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,"* 56. Weihe gave essentially the same statement to the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee July 13-14, 1892.

[52]Wall, Andrew *Carnegie*, 553

on April 1, 1892,[53] was no William Abbott; he did not intend to yield to labor. He would offer the union a new contract whose terms would be so unfavorable that it would be outright rejected. The union could take it or leave it, and if the union turned it down, as Frick was sure it would, he would go on to deal with the workers on an individual basis. In that case, "unionism in the Carnegie Steel empire would be eliminated."[54]

The position of Andrew Carnegie might have been unclear to some of the workers because of his dual personality regarding labor matters in the past; they remembered his intervening in the coal strike in 1887, when he essentially forced Frick to settle on labor's behalf.[55] One would think that Carnegie's position should have been obvious to Frick, however, based on the notice Carnegie sent to him from New York on April 4, 1892. The notice, addressed to the employees at Homestead Works, was never posted, but there was no reason for Frick to doubt what Carnegie wanted. While indirectly referring to the forthcoming official merger on July 1, 1892, of Carnegie Phipps & Company and Carnegie Brothers & Company, to become Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, Carnegie stated in his notice:

> These works [Homestead] having been consolidated with the Edgar Thomson and Duquesne, and other mills, there has been forced upon this Firm the question Whether its Works are to be run 'Union' or 'Non-Union.' As the vast majority of our employees are Non-Union, the Firm has decided that the minority must give place to the majority. These works therefore, will be necessarily Non-Union after the expiration of the present agreement. … A scale will be arranged which will compare favorably with that at the other works named; that is to say, the Firm intends that the men of Homestead shall make as much as the men at either Duquesne or Edgar Thomson. . . . This action is not taken in any spirit of hostility to labor organizations, but every man will see that the firm cannot run Union and Non-Union. It must be either one or the other.[56]

Carnegie must have presented a high level of frustration to Frick because it seemed that Carnegie was vacillating on his position. Exactly one month after he had written the notice, he wrote to Frick from Coworth Park, in Sunningdale, England, asking him to make a change in the notice because as he said,

> I did not get it quite right, because I think it said that the firm had to make the decision of "Union" or "Non-Union." This I am sure, is wrong. We need not make that point, and we should not. We simply say that consolidation having taken place, we must introduce the same system in our works; we do not care whether a man belongs to as many Unions or organizations as he chooses, but he must conform the system in our works. . . . One thing we are all sure of: No contest will be entered in that will fail. It will be harder this time at Homestead than it would have been last time when we had the

[53]Latton, "Steel Wonders," *The Pittsburg Times*, June 1, 1892, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,*" 13.

[54]Wall, "Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike," in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,*" 4

[55]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 556

[56]Andrew Carnegie, "Notice to Employees at Homestead Works," in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,*" 26.

> matter in our own hands. . . On the other hand, your reputation will shorten it, so that I really do not believe it will be much of a struggle. We all approve of anything you do, not stopping short of approval of contest. We are with you to the end.[57]

With Carnegie out of the country and with Frick being in charge, the new chief determined that he had to follow his own strategy. When the union proposed to Frick that the contract be renewed on the terms of the 1889 agreement, he quickly rejected it and submitted the proposals of his own, knowing full well that they would be totally unacceptable to the Association. His assumption was absolutely correct; the union categorically rejected them. The major pints of Frick's proposals were the following:

> The minimum price on steel billets below which the sliding scale would not go would be $22, not $25; second, the termination date for the new contract would be 31 December 1894; and third the tonnage rate would be cut 15 per cent to allow management to get a share of the advantage of the increased production resulting from the new machinery.[58]

Even though the union sensed that Frick was placing it into either a strike or a total surrender or its recent gains, it sought to avoid a showdown by trying to keep negotiations open. The Association, through its workers' committee, selected one of its own, William T. Roberts, to be the chief negotiator with the company. Roberts told the company that the Association would be willing to accept reductions in the minimum for the sliding scale as well as for the tonnage rates if management could show that it was necessary and according to Roberts, "We want to settle without trouble; we don't want a strike."[59]

Frick remained steadfast. On May 30 Roberts and the workmen's committee were called into the office of the mill superintendent, John Potter, and were presented with what became known as Frick's ultimatum. That was, that the wage scale rates had been established on the basis of the market price of $22 a ton, and that "unless the lodges accepted his terms by 24 June, the company would negotiate with the men individually and not through the Association." Roberts reminded Potter that he had earlier been told to come back with a scale which the Association could live with and that the company would enter into negotiations and "arrange the thing in an amicable manner." Potter's response was, "I can't help it, it is Mr. Frick's ultimatum." For all intents and purposes, that ended all conferences with the company, because a meeting on June 23

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[57]Andrew Carnegie, Ltr. To Henry C. Frick, May 4, 1892. Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 545 This reference makes it quite clear that the letter was written in England after Carnegie had conferred with two of his partners, Henry Phipps, Jr. and George Lauder, who were in England at the time. In his article, "Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike," 5, Wall says that Carnegie wrote his letter of confidence to Frick on May 4, 1892 before leaving for his "annual summer sojourn in Scotland." In the article, Wall does not refer to Carnegie's changing his mind. It seemed that Carnegie was doing "double talk." While on the one hand saying that a man could belong to as many unions as he chose, he was also saying that he must conform to the system at the other works. The latter meant no unions, because there were none at the other works.

[58]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 551 For a full discussion by Frick regarding the company's proposals see, *The Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette*, July 8, 1892, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red*," 27.

[59]William T. Roberts, *U.S. Senate Report No. 1280*, testimony given on November 24, 1892, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red*," 43.

with company officials in Pittsburgh lasted for only a few minutes.[60] At that June 23 meeting the workers' committee agreed to a new minimum of $24 and Potter told the committee that he thought he could get the company to agree upon a $23 minimum, which did occur. Neither side would acquiesce on tonnage rates and the terminal date for the next contract. The terminal date of July 1 rather than December 31 was very important to the workers, due to the hardships they would face should a strike be necessary during winter months. Knowing this concern of the workers caused Frick to be that more insistent upon the December 31 termination.[61]

In the meantime, Frick relied upon the support from Carnegie in his May 4 letter, wherein Carnegie had written to his chairman: "We all approve of anything you do, . . . We are with you to the end." On June 10, Carnegie corresponded with Frick while still in England: "Of course, you will be asked to confer, and I know you will decline all conferences, as you have taken your stand and have nothing more to say." Carnegie definitely expected a shutdown of some sort:

> Potter will, no doubt, intimate to the men that refusal of scale means running only as Non-Union. This may cause acceptance, but I do not think so. The chances are, you will have to prepare for a struggle, in which case the notice [i.e. that the works are henceforth to be non-union] should go up promptly on the morning of the 25th. Of course you will win, and win easier than you suppose, owing to the present condition of markets.[62]

From all appearances, Frick expected trouble, as did the union. Even before the May 30 ultimatum, William Roberts and his fellow workers saw trouble forthcoming. Roberts testified before the U.S. Senate that the men saw the force of what was happening. When they saw Frick was "building high fences and grating up our sewers . . . everybody commenced to look suspicious," they gave Roberts the authority to meet with Superintendent Potter and try to negotiate a settlement.[63]

What had been happening and what was likely to happen at Homestead had not gone unnoticed by the newspapers. In anticipation of an upcoming confrontation between capital and labor, newspapermen, artists, and telegraphers descended on Pittsburgh and Homestead during June.[64] There had been for some time a high level of expectancy that something big was going to happen at Homestead, knowing that the principal players were world leaders in the manufacture of steel and "beyond question the most powerful independent labor union in the world."[65] The preceding assessment, made by the *Pittsburgh Post* at the time of the national convention of the

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[60]Ibid.

[61]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 555

[62]Andrew Carnegie, ltr. To Henry C. Frick, June 10, 1892, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,"* 26 This is another example of Carnegie's going back and forth on his position.

[63]Roberts, testimony before the U.S. Senate, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,"* 43

[64]Russell W. Gibbons, "Dateline Homestead," in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red*" 158

[65]*The Pittsburgh Post*, June 7, 1892, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red*," 32

Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers meeting in Pittsburgh starting on June 7, 1892, painted a grim picture of the Homestead situation. The paper went on to say:

> The members of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers are fortifying themselves for the most desperate struggle known in the organization's history. There can be no mistaking the situation: the manufacturers are determined upon a general reduction of wages, and the association is just as determined that it will not stand the proposed cut.

A reporter for the same paper interviewed Superintendent Potter on June 15, asking him specifically if trouble was expected. Later events proved that Potter was being far from truthful when he responded that he did not know anything about any trouble and did not think there was going to be any. "Our mills are running full turn [24 hours] and we have orders ahead that will keep us busy for a year at least," he said. "Our men make good pay . . . . [and] they are better paid than in most places," he told the reporter. "I don't think they intend to strike," he went on to say. In explaining about the fence, he said, "We have bought some new ground and are fencing it in, as we have done with all our grounds." Regarding the prospects of hiring non-union men Potter said, "We do not intend to employ non-union men, and have never though of it. I think our men will sign the scale."[66]

Less than two weeks later, on June 28, the *Pittsburgh Post* carried the headline **"LOOKS LIKE WAR."** What followed bore no resemblance to what was reported earlier. This time, the reporter wrote it the way he saw it:

> The preparations for an actual siege at the Homestead Steel and Iron Mills exceed anything of the kind ever heard of before. The company, judging from all outward appearances at least, is getting ready to withstand violent attacks. This would seem to argue that, in spite of declarations a couple of weeks ago that the firm was not contemplating the employment of non-union labor, this was the very thing preparing to carry the day their own way in spite of opposition.

The fence surrounding the mills and extending all the way down to the low water mark of the Monongahela had caused the enclosed area to be referred to as "Fort Frick" because of the formidable appearance it presented. The reporter vividly described what resembled a future battle zone:

> The great fences that surround the mill are stronger than any fences one ordinarily sees. They are in reality massive board walls, and strung along the top are two wicked rows of jagged barbed wire. At each of the gates immense fire plugs have also been placed with an enormous water pressure in each. In all of the dark places and exposed portions of the mills are lights of 2,000 candle power each . . . . Port holes with ugly mouths grimly look out upon the peaceful valley from the mill, fort, barricade, stockade or whatever the Carnegie plant at Homestead could be called today, and silently bear witness that they are there, not for the peaceful purposes of steel manufacture, but for struggle and fight.

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[66] *The Pittsburgh Post*, June 15, 1892 in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 31

The *Post* article noted that word had been received the previous night that 300 Pinkertons would be coming to Homestead.[67]

Frick had, in fact, been in contact with Robert A. Pinkerton of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency as early as May 22 regarding use of Pinkerton guards at Homestead. In his letter to Pinkerton on June 2, he referred to Pinkerton's "favor of the 22d," then proceeded to specify in detail what he wanted that organization to do:

> We will want 300 guards for service at our Homestead mills as a measure of prevention against indifference [interference] with our plan to start the operation of the works on July 6, 1892. The only trouble we anticipate is that an attempt will be made to prevent such of our men, with whom we will by that time have made satisfactory arrangements, from going to work and possibly some demonstration of violence upon the part of those whose places have been filled, or most likely by an element which usually is attracted to such scenes for the purpose of stirring up trouble. We are not desirous that the men you send shall be armed unless the occasion properly calls for such a measure later on for the protection of our employees or property. We shall wish these guards to be placed upon our property and there to remain unless called into other service by civil authorities . . . . These guards should be assembled at Ashtabula, Ohio, not later than the morning of July 5, where they may be taken by train to McKees Rocks, or some other point on the Ohio River below Pittsburg where they can be transferred to boats and landed within the enclosures of our premises at Homestead. We think absolute secrecy essential in the movement of these men so that no demonstration can be made while they are enroute. . . As soon as your men are upon the premises we will notify the sheriff and ask that they be deputized either at once or immediately upon an outbreak [sic] of such a character as to render such a step desirable.[68]

The use of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency to provide guard service for employers of mass labor had been a common practice for many years. The agency had been founded by young Scottish immigrant Allan Pinkerton, in 1850. By the late nineteenth century, it had become the symbol of labor oppression.[69] With Allen Pinkerton's death in 1886, his two sons, William and Robert, continued the business with great success. Before becoming involved in the Homestead incident of July 1892, the Pinkertons had been used by Frick in dealing with labor problems in the coal field of western Pennsylvania, they had been used by Carnegie in the 1888 lockout/strike

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[67]*The Pittsburgh Post,* June 28, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 40

[68]H.C. Frick, ltr. To Robert A. Pinkerton, June 2, 1892, contained in *U.S. Senate Report No. 1280, Exhibit C.*, in testimony given November 23, 1892, by H.C. Frick, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 30 Wall, in Andrew Carnegie, 556, dates this letter as June 25, citing George Harvey, *Henry Clay Frick—The Man,* 114-115. Also see Kaushik Mukerjee, "'We Never Sleep'—The Pinkerton National Detective Agency," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 71, for reference to Frick's request of June 2, 1892.

[69]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 547

at Edgar Thomson and had been brought to Pittsburgh in July 1889 for potential use at Homestead. By the summer of 1892, the Pinkerton Agency had been widely condemned by unionists, journalists, and politicians for their role in settling labor disputes. They were so hated that "their mere presence frequently added the spark that led to an explosion of violence." In Pennsylvania the agency had become notorious for its "suppression of the Molly Maguires, a secret organization of Irish-American miners in the coal fields of Pennsylvania, in the 1870's."[70]

As the end of June approached, with neither the company nor the union changing its position, a showdown of some sort was inevitable. The company formally initiated a lockout on June 28 by closing the 119-inch plate mill and one of the open-hearth departments and locking out 800 men. At this point, the situation was a lockout, not a strike, because the workers had not voluntarily walked off the job. It was a different story on the morning of June 29, however, when 3,000 steelworkers met in the Homestead opera house and unanimously supported the negotiating committee's rejection of the company's final offer, which had raised the minimum scale to $23. At this point, there was a combination lockout/strike. To supervise workers' activities during the lockout/strike an Advisory Committee, consisting of fifty members from the eight lodges of the Amalgamated Association of Iron & Steel Workers, was chosen. Headquarters for the Committee was set up on the third floor of the Bost Building at Heisel Street and Eighth Avenue.[71]

In the afternoon of the 29th, laborers walked out of the steel works in support of action taken by the AAISW. At midnight on that evening the company shut down every department of the giant steel works. Altogether, 3,800 men were out of work. Even though the workers had rejected the company's offer, thereby refusing to work, they still regarded the situation as being one of a lockout rather than a strike because the company had laid the entire mill off one day ahead of the technical expiration of the contract.[72] At the time of the shut down, the company posted notices which stated: "All employees of the several departments will report to the office on Saturday next, July 2, when they will receive their fully pay." This amounted to a discharge of the entire work force.[73]

One of the first things the Advisory Committee did after its establishment was to assume control of the mills and the borough of Homestead. Acting in concert with Burgess John McLuckie, also a member of AAISW, the Committee moved immediately to close temporarily all saloons in the borough and to establish regular police patrols manned by dedicated union men. A picket system, just as had existed in 1889, was established to prevent the introduction of outside workers and Pinkertons. The government of the borough was now completely in the hands of the Advisory Committee, with its main objectives being to preserve order and decency and to protect life and

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[70]Mukerjee, "The Pinkerton National Detective Agency," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 70-71.

[71]Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 46; Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 310-311.

[72]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 311.

[73]*The Pittsburgh Post,* June 30, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 47

property as well as the keeping of non-union men out of Homestead.[74] Burgess McLuckie spoke for himself as well as for the other workers when he told a reporter for *The World* what Homestead meant to them when he said that they did not propose that Andrew Carnegie's representatives shall bulldoze them. There was too much at stake: "We have our homes in this town, we have our churches here, our societies and our cemeteries. We are bound to Homestead by all the ties that men hold dearest and most sacred."[75]

Chairman of the Advisory Committee was Hugh O'Donnell, who had served in the same capacity in 1889. O'Donnell personally accompanied a reporter for *The World* as they moved out on the "steam-yacht" Edna in the Monongahela at 9:30 in the evening on July 1 to cross over to the town of Rankin where they would check out a report that the Baltimore and Ohio evening express was carrying a train load of non-union men. The alarm turned out to be false, but the fast response of O'Donnell and the one thousand other men who crossed the river in skiffs was indicative of the way in which the Advisory Committee had organized to take care of matters.[76]

The Committee had organized on a military basis, as they had in 1889 and in 1882.[77] The force used to carry out the directions of the Committee consisted of four thousand men, divided into three divisions or watches, with each division devoting eight hours of the twenty-four hour day to watching the mill. Each of the division commanders had eight captains, representing one trusted man from each of the lodges. The captains reported to the division commanders, who in turn received their orders from the Advisory Committee. During their hours of duty, the captains had personal charge of important posts, i.e., the river front, the water gates and pumps, the railway stations, and the main gates. So complete and detailed was the plan of campaign that in ten minutes the Committee could communicate with the men at any given point within a radius of five miles.[78]

The Committee, under the direction of O'Donnell, declared a policy of no violence. It made every effort to ensure that the integrity of the mill and town would be maintained through peaceful means. O'Donnell told the reporter for *The World*, "Don't look for a battle. Everyone of our men is whispering to himself the watchword 'hands down.' You will see no pistols or clubs or stones." He went on to say that they would "simply surround these strangers, whether they be 'black sheep,' workmen or Pinkerton detectives and very gently but very firmly push them away from this locality."[79]

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[74]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 311.

[75]*The World*, July 3, 1892, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,"* 56

[76]*The World*, July 2, 1892.

[77]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 311.

[78]Hugh O'Donnell, Speech, contained within James Howard Bridge, *The Inside Story of the Carnegie Steel Company* (New York: Aldine Book Co., 1902), in Demarest, *The River Ran Red,"* 54.

[79]*The World*, July 2, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 51

While an open confrontation had not occurred, Homestead was getting national attention. For one thing, on July 1 the Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, officially came into being with Henry Clay Frick as its Chairman, although Frick had been functioning as the overall head for some months. The merger of Carnegie, Phipps & Company and Carnegie Brothers & Company had created the largest steel company in the world, and the two leading individuals connected with the firm, Carnegie and Frick were not only world leaders in the manufacture of steel, they were very high profile individuals when it came to politics. The labor situation at Homestead had gotten the attention of President Benjamin Harrison. During the week preceding July 1, according to an account in *The World,* Christopher Magee, the Pennsylvania Republican boss and close ally of Andrew Carnegie, Henry Frick, and the company lawyer, Philander C. Knox, had a number of conferences with President Harrison. The report was that the president had directed Magee to carry the message to the mill owners "that the trouble must be patched up at all hazards." Magee was reportedly told "that upon his success in effecting a peaceful settlement would depend the President's favor in the distribution of Federal patronage in Pennsylvania."[80] Magee, would indeed play a leading role in directing Allegheny County Sheriff William H. McCleary in the course of dealing with the forthcoming events at Homestead.[81]

As the lockout/strike continued, each day brought heightened expectation of an impending crisis. Newspapermen, with as many as fifty journalists and sketch artists there before the initial lockout on June 29, were busily reporting on everything happening and speculating on things to come. The first floor of the Bost Building was used to house a telegraph office and headquarters for the press.[82]

In its July 2 edition, the *New York Times* accurately sized up the situation: "it's evident that there is no 'bluffing' at Homestead. The fight there is to be to the death between the Carnegie Steel Company, limited, with its $25,000,000 capital and the workmen." The *Times* reported that the company Secretary, F. T. F. Lovejoy, had given formal notice that day that "the Homestead Mill is to be operated as a non-union plant and that no expense is to be spared to gain this point." Lovejoy told the reporter that the mills had been closed for repairs, remaining closed for two or three weeks. About the 15th or 20th of July, notices would be posted that any of the old employees may return to work, but they must make application by a certain day as individuals. According to Lovejoy, the wages of only 280 men of the 3,800 men employed in the mills, were affected by the new scales. While the wages of the remaining workers would remain the same, their strong loyalty to their organization caused them to join the overall fight. The reporter also interviewed Hugh O'Donnell, who brought him up to date on the level of preparedness of the Advisory Committee. "We now have our organization perfect," O'Donnell said. "We will be in touch with every city and hamlet in the United States, and will be enabled to hear the moment a train of men for the mill leaves other cities.[83]

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[80]*The World,* July 2, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 50

[81]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 28.

[82]Gibbons, "Dateline Homestead," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 158

[83]*The New-York Times,* July 2, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 55

The Advisory Committee used its headquarters building, the Bost Building, as the command center for directing the surveillance activities of the men. That function was facilitated by setting up a signal station on the roof of the headquarters, which provided a full view of "Fort Frick" and the surrounding area. Men positioned in the station using field glasses could "gaze over the ramparts and take a leisurely survey of what . . . [was] going on in the enemy's camp." During the day the men at the station could signal by the use of colored flags to pickets on the north side of the Monongahela. At night a strong flashlight was used to signal. The river patrol was equipped to send up rockets when necessary. Based upon what was observed from the signal station, word would be quickly relayed to division commanders as to what action was to be taken. The signal system was so effective that within ten minutes a pontoon of skiffs could be thrown across the Monongahela, either to intercept and board a steam boat, or to place a large body of men to the other side of the river. To help in sounding a general alarm, the electric light works was set up to do just that by sounding its steam whistle.[84]

While the Advisory Committee had "perfected" its operational plans, the company was moving ahead with its plan to bring 300 Pinkerton guards/agents to the mills so that they could reopen with scab workers. On July 4, Frick sent his final instructions to Robert Pinkerton. "We have all our arrangements perfected," Frick told Pinkerton, "to receive your men at Ashtabula, and to conduct them to Bellevue Station, a few miles below this City on the Ohio River." The plan was to have the guards transferred to two boats and two barges at 11 o'clock on the evening of July 5 and start immediately for the Homestead works, arriving there about 3 o'clock on the morning of July 6. "The boats are well provisioned," Frick assured Pinkerton. "All the uniforms etc. that you have had shipped to the Union Supply Company," he wrote, "are on board the boat." On the boat also would be the sheriff's chief deputy who would accompany and remain with the guards.[85] The arrangements with Sheriff McCleary were worked out in a series of meetings with company attorney, Philander Knox. During the meetings Knox requested McCleary to deputize the Pinkertons, with McCleary declining to do so.[86]

On the morning of July 5, McCleary and two of his deputies, former sheriffs Joseph Gray and Samuel Cluley, came to Homestead and met with the Advisory Committee. At that time, Sheriff McCleary informed the Committee that they were at the request of Frick to provide protection of the property and buildings of the company. The Committee offered to provide that protection, but the sheriff said he preferred to have his own men. Following the meeting, the Committee took the sheriff and his associates on an inspection tour of the plant, then returned to the headquarters. The sheriff said he saw no signs of disorder, and that he saw no need to send deputies. Yet, he said he would send deputies back to Homestead that afternoon because he "must perform his duties." The Committee, wanting to discuss the matter among themselves, asked the sheriff to leave the room. After an hour they brought Sheriff McCleary back into the room and O'Donnell made a surprising announcement:

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[84]*The Pittsburgh Dispatch*, July 4, July 5, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 58, 61

[85]H. C. Frick, Letter, to Robert A. Pinkerton, July 4, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 57.

[86]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 27.

> Sheriff McCleary, the last meeting of the Advisory Committee has just been concluded. We, as members of that committee, have, after due deliberation, resolved to formally dissolve this committee, and we have asked you in here in order that you may witness the spectacle. The Advisory Committee from now on will not be responsible for any disorder or any lawless act perpetrated either in Homestead borough or Mifflin Township…. Our responsibility ceases from this very moment. I now declare the Advisory Committee to be dead.

Committee members removed their badges of office, then proceeded to burn committee documents in the open fireplace. O'Donnell, turning to the sheriff, said, "You have seen all; have you anything further to say to us?' To which, McCleary replied: "Gentlemen, I have nothing more to say. Good afternoon."

After the sheriff had left, three unnamed labor leaders sent a telegram to W.J. Brennen, their legal counsel in Pittsburgh asking him to seek a temporary injunction to restrain the sheriff from sending deputies, because "it is a move calculated to cause unnecessary disturbance." Before the attorney could respond, ten armed deputies arrived by train at the Munhall station. The deputies were met by 2,000 men who had massed themselves on the road-bed and platform. Leader of the deputies was Deputy Sheriff Samuel Cluley, who had been to Homestead that morning. Cluley had a proclamation which he read from Sheriff McCleary, in which the sheriff declared unlawful the assembling and congregating at and near the Carnegie Steel Company, Limited and interfering with workmen employed in the works obtaining access to them, etc. When Cluley concluded reading the proclamation, he and his associates were "engirdled by a solid wall of surging humanity." A man from the audience shouted to the crowd: "Order, boys, order; these gentlemen are now in our care and you must protect them from the unthinking mob." The decision was made to march the deputies from the Munhall station to the Bost Building, until that morning the headquarters of the Advisory Committee. Hugh O'Donnell led the march. The deputies were escorted to the side entrance of the building and up the narrow stairs to the large smoke-filled room on the third floor. The deputies were given the choice of free transportation back to Pittsburgh or to remain in Homestead and take the consequences. They chose the former and were put on the steamer Edna and delivered to Glenwood Village, where they continued their journey back to Pittsburgh.[87]

Excitement began to mount around 2:30 on the morning of July 6, when a guard from Homestead from his lookout position on the Smithfield Street Bridge in Pittsburgh spotted two darkened barges moving quietly up the Monongahela. The alarm was quickly sent to Homestead by way of telegram and by rider on horseback. The barges, the *Monongahela* and the *Iron Mountain,* were being towed by a single steamboat, the *Little Bill,* rather than two boats as Frick had planned. The community was awakened by what the *New York Herald* reporter described as a sound "like the trumpet of judgment" blowing the steam whistle of the electric light works at twenty minutes to three o'clock.[88] Around four o'clock the barges approached the company's

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[87]*The Pittsburgh Dispatch,* July 6, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 66-69.

[88]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 558; *New York Herald,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 76; William Serrin, *Homestead: The Glory and Tragedy of an American Steel Town* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 75.

landing wharf, At the same time, thousands of men and boys grabbed up rifles, hoes, and the staves off picket fences and rushed to the river bank to confront the Pinkertons as they attempted to land. Many women armed with clubs joined the throng streaming up the railroad tracks toward the Pemickey bridge crossing over the Monongahela. Great crowds of men, workers and townspeople, stormed the works, tearing down parts of the wooden fence which had caused the area to be named "Fort Frick," and entered the works, setting up barricades and taking up positions for battle. Up to this time, the workers had not trespassed the company's property since the lockout/strike began.[89] Now, the workers were in the mill and to get them out would require force, which the Pinkertons thought they could provide.

Labor leaders, including Hugh O'Donnell and O. O. Coon, made their way to the landing site and tried to control the crowd and to communicate with the Pinkertons. When O'Donnell could not make himself heard above the noise of the crowd, Captain Coon of the Advisory Committee's Sixth Regiment, climbed to an elevated position "and with a giant's strength shouted to the men: 'For God's sake put down your guns and look to the protection of your families.'"[90] O'Donnell then addressed the Pinkerton's, stressing non-violence as he had counseled the workmen, in an impassioned plea:

> On behalf of five thousand men, I beg you to leaver here at once. . . . I do know that you have no business here, and if you remain there will be more bloodshed. We, the workers in these mills, are peaceably inclined. We have not damaged any property, and we do not intend to. . . . In the name of God and humanity, don't attempt to land! Don't attempt to enter these works by force.

Captain Frederick H. Heinde, stepped onto the deck of the *Iron Mountain* and identified himself and his men as agents of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, who had been sent there to take possession of the mill property and to guard it for the company. While Heinde said he did not wish any bloodshed, he made quite clear his determination to carry out his mission: "If you men don't withdraw, we will mow every one of you down and enter in spite of you. You had better disperse, for land we will!" Still trying to restrain the crowd, O'Donnell shouted to Heinde: "I have no more to say. What you do here is at the risk of many lives. Before you enter those mills, you will trample over the dead bodies of three thousand honest workingmen."[91]

The workers who were most intent upon the Pinkertons not landing including such men as Billy Foy, Martin Murray, Joseph Sotak, and Andrew Souljer.[92] They wasted no time in getting to the river bank where the boat and barges were attempting to land. An angry mass of men were on the steep bank beneath the pump house, waiting for the Pinkertons to make their next move. The gangpland of *Little Bill* went down and the Pinkerton captain started moving toward the shore. Before he could come ashore, Billy Foy, a middle aged Englishmen and leader of the Homestead corps of the Salvation Army, "marched resolutely to the foot of the gangplank." Captain Heinde

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[89]Serrin, *Homestead,* 77.

[90]*St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* July 6, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 80

[91]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 18.

[92]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 19. Krause spells the name Soulier.

cried out, “Now, men, we are coming ashore to guard these works and we want to come without bloodshed. There are three hundred men behind me and you cannot stop us.” Foy responded: “Come on, and if you come you’ll come over my carcass,” then threw himself face down on the gangplank. The captain slashed Foy’s head with a billy-club and tried to push him away.[93]

About that time, two shouts rang out. Both sides insisted that the first shot came from the other side. In a testimony given to the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Charles Mansfield, a Homestead real-estate worker, said that from his position “at the corner of the brick pump house, the new one the machinery is not in yet,” he saw the Pinkertons fire the first shot from the boat which was tied up above the pump house.[94] Captain William B. Rodgers, owner and operator of the *Little Bill*, said that the man lying on the landing stage, meaning Billy Foy, fired the first shot. Rodgers qualified his statement, however, by adding, “I mean the first shot that did any damage,” that is, the wounding of Pinkerton Captain Heinde.[95] Also, Deputy Sheriff Gray, who had been on *Little Bill* from the time the Pinkertons had boarded, maintained that the first shot was from the “mob on the bank.”[96]

While there would never be agreement as to which side fired the first shot, it is an established fact that one shot came from behind the Pinkerton captain, hitting Foy and sending him writhing on the landing with a bullet through his body. Another shot came from the workers, whether or not it was from Foy is unknown, striking the captain in the thigh. Those two shots signaled the beginning of heavy firing from both sides, continuing for ten minutes. At the end of that time, a council of war was held on each side, with Homestead Steel Works Superintendent John Potter and the Pinkertons in the barges, and the workers in their makeshift defenses. During the break it was decided that the captain of the *Little Bill* would take Captain Heinde, whose wound was considered life threatening, and five other wounded Pinkertons to Port Perry for transfer to Pittsburgh for treatment. One of the Pinkertons died before reaching the hospital.[97] In the barrage of shots from the barges, three workers had gone down Martin Murray, Andrew Souljer, and George Rutter. No mention is made of the extent of Souljer’s injuries. Rutter would die eleven days later in a Pittsburgh hospital in a bed next to the one occupied by Captain Heinde, and Murray would recover. Another mill worker, Joseph Sotak, would be killed instantly while he was trying to move Murray’s prostrate body. But this was after the initial firing episode.[98]

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[93]*New York Herald,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *“The River Ran Red,”* 76; *The Pittsburg Leader*, July 10, 1892, in Ibid., 80-81; Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 19.

[94]Charles Mansfield, *U.S. House of Representatives Report No. 2447,* testimony given July 14, 1892, in Demarest, The River Ran Red,” 82.

[95]*The Pittsburgh Leader*, July 10, 1892, in Demarest, *“The River Ran Red,”* 80-81.

[96]Joseph H. Gray, Testimony, July 13, 1892, *U.S. House of Representatives Report No. 2447,* February 1893, in Demarest, *“The River Ran Red,”* 93.

[97]*Ibid;* Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 20

[98]*New York Herald,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *“The River Ran Red,”* 77; Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 20

It was obvious to the workers that the confrontation with the Pinkertons was not going to end with the initial ten minutes. Workers were busy preparing their defenses and securing weapons. The former Advisory Committee had established an arsenal in its headquarters on the third floor of the Bost Building. Workers combed the town for weapons and brought them to the headquarters for further distribution to anyone willing to fight.[99] By the time the *Little Bill* got underway, leaving the *Monongahela* and *Iron Mountain* moored at the landing site, sharpshooters among the workers had taken up positions in the mill yard "wherever a pile of coal, or small building, or freight car afforded protection, other sharpshooters were on the piers of the railroad bridge about three hundred yards distant." Included among the havens of protection for the mill were connected with supply lines.[100]

On the north side of the river, "400 yards from the boat, men lay behind ties and hastily thrown-up breastworks, and sent bullets into the side of the barge whenever one of the occupants showed any party of his body." Also on the north side of the river, "near the big stone pier of the railroad bridge," workers had positioned a small brass cannon, known as "Griffin's Pet," which they had borrowed from the local Grand Army post. The cannon turned out to be ineffective in hitting the barges. Most of the time it overshot its target, with one slug striking mill worker Silas Waine in the neck, killing him. About 10 o'clock the cannon was brought back across the river and placed in the gas house, where it would be used to fire at the barges through holes knocked in the brick wall.[101]

Fighting resumed about 8:00 A.M. when the Pinkertons made another attempt to come ashore to seize the steel works. Suddenly a shot was fired from behind the workers' position, resulting in a quick return fire from the Pinkertons. In the fighting that followed, the workers would suffer their greatest loss: four men would die. The first to fall was John E. Morris, a 28-year old immigrant from Wales. Morris, along with other workers, had taken a position on the pump house, which sat high above the landing site, providing a good spot from which to fire at the barges. During a lull in the fighting, Morris moved from his position to get a better view of what was happening.

While the workers and townspeople were becoming increasingly enraged by seeing the wounded and dead being taken to their homes, the Pinkertons were becoming demoralized by the seemingly indefensible position they were in, particularly since the towboat, *Little Bill*, did not return until almost 11:00 A.M. Much to Captain Rodgers' surprise, the workers did not stop their firing when he returning firing flying the American flag from *LittleBill;* instead, the firing intensified and Rodgers narrowly missed being struck. Unable to land the boat, Rodgers was forced to allow *Little Bill* to drift downstream, leaving those on the barges stranded with no hope of immediate rescue. In the meantime, the workers undertook a series of unsuccessful, though frightening, efforts to sink the barges. First, there was the raft with oil soaked lumber set on fire and started downstream toward the barges, only to burn itself out before colliding with the

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[99]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 21.

[100]*New York Herald*, July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 77; The World, July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 83-84.

[101]*The World*, July 10, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 83-84.

barges. The next fireball was a railroad flatcar, loaded with burning boxes and rags, and sent hurtling down the railroad track running from the mill to the landing, only to run off the track before getting to the landing.[102] Hoping to blow up the barges, the workers tried to dynamite them, but to no avail. Even a burning oil spill did not destroy the barges.[103] Amidst all of the failed attempts to destroy the barges, steady firing continued from the workers. About noon time, a second Pinkerton agent, twenty-four year old Thomas J. Connors, was killed. A third Pinkerton, Edward A. R. Speer, was shot in the leg and died in a Pittsburgh hospital on July 17.[104] By this time, the Pinkertons were ready to surrender and started raising surrender flags, only to have them shot down.[105]

While the battle was raging in Homestead, Allegheny County Sheriff, William McCleary, was meeting in Pittsburgh with political "boss" Christopher Magee and William Weihe, national president of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, trying to work out a resolution of the problem at Homestead. Weihe stressed that the only way to avoid further bloodshed was for Frick and the workers to have a meeting. An emissary carried that message to Frick, who did the expected, he refused to negotiate. The message Frick sent to Weihe made that point quite clear: "The time for conferences ended on the 24th of June. I will see no person who represents the Amalgamated Association." Later that day, Frick spoke to the press, stating that the company was "not taking any active part in the matter at present." The company, he stated, could not interfere with the sheriff in the discharge of his duties, and it was "awaiting his further action."[106]

McCleary's only option at this point, seemed to be seeking assistance from Governor Robert E. Pattison, in the form of the Pennsylvania National Guard. After consultation with Magee, which would be a frequent occurrence during the next two days, McCleary sent a telegram to the governor, describing the situation at Homestead and asking for military assistance. Pattison's quick response was: "Local authorities must exhaust every means at their command for the preservation of Peace." Shortly after noon McCleary sent another telegram to the governor, urging him to act at once. This time the governor replied with questions: "How many deputies have you sworn in and what means have you taken to enforce order and protect property?" At the same time, Governor Pattison sent a telegram to the former Advisory Committee in Homestead advising it that he had refused to mobilize the Pennsylvania National Guard. During the early afternoon McCleary sent a third telegram to the governor pleading with him to send an armed and disciplined force at once to prevent further loss of life. This time, the governor's reason for his delayed response was that the sheriff had "not made any attempt to execute the law to enforce order," no troops would be coming and that he insisted that the sheriff call upon all citizens for

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[102]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 558

[103]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 24.

[104]Serrin, *Homestead,* 79.

[105]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 25.

[106]*Ibid; St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* July 6, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 79; *The World,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 96.

an adequate number of deputies.[107] The governor did, however, give an elaborate public statement regarding his refusal to send troops to Homestead:

> There is no information received from Homestead to warrant any interference from the State. The sheriff must exhaust all of his authority before the state will interfere. The state lends its aid when the local authorities are overborne. The sheriff has employed but twelve deputies up to the present time, his ordinary force. If the emergency is as great as alleged, he should have employed a thousand. It is not the purpose of the military to act as police officers. The citizens of Homestead are industrious, hard-working, intelligent people. . . . In such a community, there ought to be no difficulty as to adjustments of their troubles: certainly no question as to the preservation of the peace by local authorities. The civil authorities must in the end settle the differences.[108]

During the meeting among McCleary, Magee, and AAISW president Weihe, it was decided that Weihe should go to Homestead to help bring about a peaceful surrender of the Pinkertons. About 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon Weihe arrived in Homestead and proceeded to try and convince the workers that the Pinkertons should be allowed to leave with the understanding that they would not return. The workers could not be swayed except by their local leader, Hugh O'Donnell. O'Donnell got their attention when he grabbed the American flag carried by the three hundred armed men from South Side ironworks who had come to help, climbed on a pile of steel beams, and began to ask the men to allow a truce. It was obvious that the men respected O'Donnell, for as he began to speak hundreds of men took off their hats and shouted a lusty hurrah. They did not agree, however, to his proposal to let the Pinkertons leave. It was only after someone from the crowd spoke out that the Pinkertons should be held in the barges until the sheriff could come with warrants for their arrest on charges of murder that the crowd gave a hearty approval of that suggestion, giving O'Donnell clearance to meet with the Pinkertons.

Around 6:00 P.M., the Pinkertons raised a white flag atop the *Iron Mountain*, and two agents walked onto the deck with their hands held high, signaling their willingness to surrender. O'Donnell and two other members of the former Advisory Committee, which, in reality had never ceased to function as a committee even though it dissolved itself, proceeded to the landing to negotiate with the Pinkertons. O'Donnell assured the Pinkertons of their safe passage from Homestead, but he told them nothing of the "agreement" worked out by the crowd regarding criminal prosecution.[109] What followed was beyond anything O'Donnell and his fellow committee members had imagined. There was no way they could control what has been described as a "howling mob."[110]

A scene began to unfold that must have been unexpected by even the most creative reporters. Once it was clear that the Pinkertons were surrendering, a mob rushed for the barges and took

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[107]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 29-31.

[108]*Ibid,* 32

[109]*Ibid.* 32-34. Krause says that by 4:00 P.M., 5,000 additional reinforcements had arrived from South Side, Braddock, and Duquesne.

[110]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 559

complete possession running "like wild men about the edges and in a twinkling of an eye filled the cabins of both boats [barges]from side to side," throwing items overboard and confiscating weapons and ammunition.[111] One of the workers who rushed aboard the barges was Thomas Weldon. Grabbing a Pinkerton's Winchester rifle, Weldon proceeded to try to break it. In doing so, he caused the rifle to discharge, hitting him in the stomach. A few minutes later he was dead.[112]

As the agents left the barges they were able to walk up the bank, unmolested except for jeers and curses. Things changed when they reached the top of the bank, where they found themselves in a narrow passageway between two huge piles of rusty pig-iron, emerging into a lane between two long lines of "infuriated men who did not act like human beings." *The World* reporter gives a graphic description of what he saw happening to the Pinkertons as they "ran the gauntlet:"

> As the Pinkerton men . . . came into view they [workers] jumped upon them like a pack of wolves. The men [Pinkertons] screamed for mercy. They were beaten over the head with clubs and the butt ends of rifles. You could almost hear the skulls crack. They were kicked, knocked down and jumped upon. Their clothes were torn from their back, and when they finally escaped it was with faces of ashen paleness and with the blood in streams rushing down the backs of their heads staining their clothes. It ran in rivulets down their faces, which in the melee they had covered with their hands. They ran like hunted deer panting and screaming through the mill yards.[113]

Before the Pinkertons had reached the top of the bank, hundreds of women and boys descended on the barges, removing things like quilts, pillows, cooking utensils, etc., then began dismantling the barges. Once everything the people wanted to take had been removed, the barges were set on fire. The crowd's attention was divided between watching and participating in the gauntlet as the Pinkertons moved through the mill yards and cheering and clapping as the barges burned and sank to the bottom of the Monongahela.[114]

From the Bost Building, the procession continued on to the temporary jail in the Homestead Opera House on Fifth Avenue. As the entourage approached the Opera House serious trouble erupted when one of the Pinkertons tried to break away. As he escaped from those guarding him, a "heavy-set woman ran him down, threw him to the ground, stamped on him and threw sand in his eyes." As another prisoner was about to enter the opera house, the widow of one of the dead steelworkers, "emboldened by grief, threw herself at him and started pummeling him." Still another Pinkerton was attached by two East European immigrants: a man grabbed the agent by the throat and hit him in the face while a woman smashed his head with a club. The beating was so intense that one of the guards assigned by the Advisory Committee to protect the Pinkertons leveled his gun at the attackers and shouted: "Stand back, or . . . I'll shoot the next man or woman that raises a hand against them. We have promised to protect them, and we'll do it, even

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[111]*The World,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 86.

[112]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 34.

[113]*The World*, July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 86.

[114]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 36.

if we have to use our guns." When the crowd yelled out: "Kill the murderers," more guards pointed their rifles at the crowd and prepared to fire. At that point, Burgess John McLuckie came forward, commanded peace and assured the crowd that the Pinkertons would be locked up and held for murder.[115]

The Pinkertons did not leave Homestead until about 1:00 A.M. on Thursday, July 7. At that time a special train arrived from Pittsburgh on the Pittsburgh, Virginia, and Charleston railroad to take the Pinkertons to Pittsburgh. Sheriff McCleary and president of AAISW Weihe were on the train to assist in getting the men from the opera house to the train. The small group of spectators who were there to witness the departure of "the enemy" heeded O'Donnell's request that the prisoners be allowed to move to the train without any threat of harm; the group was undemonstrative. Some of the Pinkertons who had been wounded were allowed to leave on the early evening train to Pittsburgh.

One wounded Pinkerton agent, who happened to be seated next to a *World* correspondent on that early train, talked freely, but quietly, about his experiences that day and about who the Pinkertons were. He told the correspondent that he was a mechanic—a maker of organ bellows in Chicago. "One hundred and twenty-five of our men," he said, "came from Chicago, the balance from Brooklyn, New York and Philadelphia." He confirmed what other reports had said, that they did not know their destination. "We were hired as private watchmen," he told the reporter, "but we did not know we were to be used to shoot down honest workingmen, for we are workingmen ourselves and sympathize with the strikers now that we know the truth." "The real cause of our engagement," he affirmed, "was not made known to us until we were in sight of the steel mill. Then it was too late." He went on to relate the experiences of the day. "We were pushed ashore," he said, "and the shooting commenced. We did not fire the first shots." He told how they were left without a leader all day, "held in a slaughter pen near the shore. There was no escape," for "the barge without motive power stood an easy target for the men on shore." Contrary to other reports, he said all the men were not armed, but those with rifles used them. His fellow agents, he said, "were desperate. It was a case of being s hot to death on one side or drowning on the other. We were hopeless, and we resolved to sell our lives dearly."[116]

The train which left Homestead about 1:00 A.M., July 7, carrying the majority of the Pinkertons, arrived at the Pennsylvania Railroad yards between 2:00 and 2:15 A.M. That location was chosen by Christopher Magee as a temporary holding area, because it was regarded as the safest place until a decision could be reached on the final disposition of the agents. Magee and Sheriff McCleary decided that they would simply be taken away, without being arrested and charged, as had been the expressed desire of the Homestead workers. The attorney for AAISW, William Brennen, agreed with the decision to let the Pinkertons go free, for he reasoned, "how could anyone determine which was responsible for any of the Homestead deaths?" There was a feeling on the part of many of the steelworkers that Brennen, who later would hold high positions in Pittsburgh politics, was operating under the influence of Magee. Nevertheless, by 10:00 A.M.,

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[115]Ibid. 37-38.

[116]*The World,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 87

the Pinkertons were out of town, having been placed on trains headed for New York and Chicago.[117]

Who were the Pinkertons? Many of them were men who could not find employment elsewhere, "and so for a dollar a day and the chance to wear a bright blue uniform with shiny brass buttons, they entered the employment of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency." According to Historian Joseph Frazier Wall, the author of the prize winning biography of Andrew Carnegie, the Pinkertons who were "hated symbols to working men everywhere of everything despicable in the existing order. . . . had become the tools of the oppressors because they had been the most oppressed." "Now on this day of madness," Wall writes, "those 'Have-Nots' have become the victims of the "Have Littles.'"[118]

While the Pinkertons were on their way to their homes, the people in Homestead were preparing to bury their dead. John E. Morris, Peter Faris, and Silas Waine were buried on Thursday afternoon, July 7. Three others, Henry Streigel, Thomas Weldon, and Joseph Sotak would be buried the following day. George Rutter's death on July 17th would complete the list of seven workers who, according to the coroner's record, died as a result of the July 6 confrontation. The Pinkertons suffered three deaths.[119] There were many wounded on both sides, with the greatest number being among the Pinkertons.

There was no doubt as to which side had won on July 6. The workers had won the battle. The *Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette* reported from Homestead on the evening of July 7: "The strikers are masters of the situation to-day." The workers had given good intention to protect company property. They had rebuilt the fence around the works, cleared the mill yard of all debris, and restored the hose used in throwing oil on the water to its proper location.[120] The "war" was far from over, however. On the evening of July 6, the company spokesman, Secretary Francis Lovejoy, predicted the ultimate outcome of the events of the day:

> This outbreak settles one matter forever, and that is that the Homestead mill hereafter will be run non-union and the Carnegie Company will never again recognize the Amalgamated Association nor any other labor organization. The Homestead trouble will doubtless also have the effect of influencing other mills heretofore union to become non-union and thus free their owners from the arbitrary dictation of labor unions.[121]

The following day, Chairman Frick made an even stronger statement to the press:

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[117]Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 39-41; Serrin, *Homestead,* 81

[118]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 559-560.

[119]Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 104.

[120]*Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette,* July 8, 1892, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,"* 115

[121]Krause, *The Battle of Homestead,* 39-40.

> The question at issue is very grave one. It is whether the Carnegie Steel Company or the Amalgamated Association shall have absolute control of our plant and business at Homestead. We have decided, after numerous fruitless conferences with the Amalgamated officials in the attempt to amicably adjust the existing difficulties, to operate the plant ourselves. I can say with the greatest emphasis that under no circumstances will we have any further dealing with the Amalgamated Association as an organization. This is final.[122]

As for Andrew Carnegie, he was still vacationing in his beloved Scottish Highlands. Frick cabled him on July 7: "Small plunge, our action and position there unassailable and will work out satisfactorily."[123] The reports was getting from the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *London Times* presented a different story. In response to what he was reading in the papers and the other cables he was receiving, Carnegie cabled Frick that he was coming back home to take charge of the situation. This put fear into the hearts of senior partners George Lauder, Jr. and Henry Phipps, Jr., for they felt that if Carnegie came home it would mean the repudiation of Frick, Frick's resignation, and the triumph of the union. Both men, who were in England at the time, sent letters to Carnegie advising him to stay where he was and to keep quiet. Their advice was heeded as evidenced by Carnegie's response to a reporter who visited him at his rented lodge on July 9. When asked if he had an opinion on what had happened at Homestead, Carnegie replied: "No, sir. I am not willing to express any opinion. The men have chosen their course and I am powerless to change it. The handling of the case on the part of the company has my full approbation and sanction. Further than this I have no disposition to say anything."[124] Carnegie said something quite different when he wrote in anger to his cousin and partner, George Lauder, Jr. on July 17:

> Matters at home bad—such a fiasco trying to send guards by Boat and then leaving space between River & fences for the men to get opposite landing and fire. Still we must keep quiet & do all we can to support Frick & those at Seat of War. . . . Silence is best. We shall win, of course, but may have to shut down for months.[125]

Carnegie would write in his autobiography, twenty years after the Homestead incident: "Nothing I have ever had to meet in all my life . . . wounded me so deeply. No pangs remain of any wound received in my business career save that of Homestead. It was so unnecessary." Carnegie's expression of regret in 1912 probably fell on more receptive ears than the same expression would have received in 1892. Despite his many gestures of benevolence, younger workers at Homestead and labor throughout the country saw Carnegie as a hypocrite. In referring to Frick and Carnegie, it was commonly said: "You can't trust any of them, and it is better to confront Frick with a hard heart than a Carnegie with a false tongue."[126]

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[122]*Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette,* July 8, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 115

[123]Henry Clay Frick, cable to Carnegie, Morgan, July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 88.

[124]*St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* July 10, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 119-120.

[125]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 560-561.

[126]*Ibid.*

In Homestead there was concern that Governor Pattison would send in the Pennsylvania National Guard [state militia], especially after Sheriff McCleary came to Homestead on July 8, trying to get people to serve as deputies to protect the mill property, and was unsuccessful. Furthermore, the workers refused to surrender the mill to the sheriff. On the same day that the sheriff returned to Homestead, O'Donnell and a delegation from Homestead met with the governor for over an hour and left with the conviction that the national guard would not be sent to Homestead.[127]

The Advisory Committee, which had dissolved itself on July 5, but continued to be in control of affairs, officially reorganized itself on July 10 in its old office in the Bost Building. Reason for reorganization was that because "a number of irresponsible men were assuming authority and strutting around town giving conflicting orders. It was thought best to have some head." The Committee was to resume charge of civil matters and take responsibility of preserving order.[128] Its control would not last long, however, because the national guard would be coming to Homestead to take over.

At 10:00 P.M. on July 10, Governor Pattison announced that he would be sending the National Guard of Pennsylvania to Homestead. The governor's decision to activate the entire 8,500 member state militia was made after Pennsylvania Adjutant General Greenland returned to Harrisburg from a visit to Homestead and reported to the governor "that a collision more sanguinary and appalling than that of Wednesday was sure to result if the militia were not sent to Homestead." Greenland's report was substantiated in a telegram to the governor from Sheriff McCleary in which the sheriff told the governor that while all was quite at Homestead, the strikers were in control and were determined that the works would not be operated unless by themselves. The sheriff went on to say, "I have failed to secure a posse respectable enough in numbers to accomplish anything, and I am satisfied that no posse raised by civil authority can change the condition of affairs." "Only a large military force," he assured the governor, "will enable me to control matters."

The governor issued an order to George R. Snowden, Major General Commanding National Guard of Pennsylvania: "Put the division under arms and move at once, with ammunition to the support of the Sheriff of Allegheny County at Homestead. Maintain the peace. Protect all persons in their rights under the constitution and laws of the State."[129] In Homestead, news that the state militia would be coming was favorably received by the union leaders. On the afternoon of July 11 Burgess McLuckie called a meeting at the Homestead Opera House to explain why the troops were coming. McLuckie told his audience of "fellow-workmen and gentlemen" that the troops were coming as friends and allies, and would be received as such.[130]

For the morning of the arrival of the militia, McLuckie and his associates had planned an elaborate reception with the Homestead bands prepared to serenade the troops. There was a

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[127]Serrin, *Homestead,* 81-82.

[128]*The New York Herald,* July 11, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 127

[129]*The New York Herald,* July 11, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 129-130.

[130]*The New York Times,* July 12, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 130

festive air among those awaiting the big event. Shortly after 9:00 A.M. excitement mounted when it was announced: "The troops are coming, the troops are coming." There was some disappointment, however, because the troops came in at the Munhall station, passing up the bands and crowd as well as the labor leaders waiting for them at the Homestead station. By the time all of the militia coming to Homestead had arrived, there were a total of 8,000 there, with the remaining 500 of the total National Guard of Pennsylvania at Mt. Gretna as reserves.[131] Immediately upon leaving the train, a detachment of troops was positioned as pickets among the mill yards and the main body marched down the streets, headed by the Regiment Band. The militia then began to establish Camp Sam Black on what was, until purchased by Carnegie, Phipps, and Co. in 1890, the Pittsburgh City Poor Farm, and the future location of the Carnegie Library of Homestead and Carnegie Library Park.

The camp began on Eighth Avenue, with the headquarters of the Ninth Pennsylvania National Guards (provost Guard), located immediately south of the Bost Building.[132] The camp extended west to McClure Street, south to what became 16th Avenue and to Whitaker Creek on the east, excluding Harrison and Grant Streets. Major General George Snowden established his headquarters in the Carnegie Schoolhouse, high on the hill with a commanding view of the steel works. Outside the camp proper, guards were stationed at railroad stations, along the north side of Eighth Avenue, the length of the western edge of the steel works, at the pump house, and on the high grounds in Swissvale, overlooking the Monongahela River and the mills from the north.

Soon after the militia arrived, Hugh O'Donnell and a group of the strikers, including ex-captain of the militia, Ollie Coon, called upon General Snowden in his headquarters. The visit was for the purpose of welcoming Snowden and the troops on behalf of the strikers and the townspeople, in as much as Snowden had passed up the welcoming when his train continued to Munhall rather than stopping at Homestead. When O'Donnell asked Sheriff McCleary, who was present with the general, to introduce him, the sheriff ignored him. At that time, Captain Coon addressed General Snowden, telling him that the group had come "to speak for the citizens and for the locked-out men of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers." At this, Snowden launched into sharp response which made his position absolutely clear:

> I neither know nor care anything about them. I have no opinion to express on this subject one way or the other; I am not here to look after the strike or the Amalgamated Association or to pay any attention to either. I do not accept and do not need at your hands the freedom of Homestead. I have that now in my possession, and I propose to keep the peace. I want no strikers to come near the troops as strikers, and I want it distinctly understood that I am in absolute control of the situation.

O'Donnell amended Coon's statement by deleting reference to the union and by emphasizing that they came as citizens of Homestead and Allegheny County. General Snowden

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[131]*St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* July 12, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 131-132.

[132]Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 142-143. See illustration contained within this nomination. Also, see map, "Disposition of the militia in Homestead as shown in a report dated November 30, 1892," contained within this nomination, for the distribution of troops in Camp Sam Black.

acknowledged that he was always glad to meet the citizens, "the good citizens, of any community." When O'Donnell told the general, "We have been peaceful and law-abiding citizens," the military commander, sternly and emphatically interrupted O'Donnell:

> No, you have not; you have not been peaceful and law-abiding citizens, Sir; you have defied and insulted the sheriff, and I want to say to you and to the strikers that the governor has instructed me to announce to you that we are here to aid the sheriff. . . . If you insist on it, Sir, I can go further into the conduct of you and your men. You had better not insist. I want to assure you, however, once more that we care nothing about your association or your strike. The peace will be preserved at any cost.

Despite the general's diatribe, O'Donnell offered to have for brass bands and a parade pass in review before the camp to show the community's support. Needless to say, General Snowden quickly rejected O'Donnell's offer of hospitality: "I don't want any brass-band business while I'm here. I want you to distinctly understand that I am master of this situation." O'Donnell and his group discouraged and angered by the general's demeanor, hastily retreated.[133] There was not the slightest doubt that the military was in complete control. The Advisory Committee, while relinquishing overseeing the preservation of law and order in Homestead, continued to provide the coordination for matters pertaining to settlement of the strike.

The *New York Times* correctly sized up the situation with headlines which read: "Bayonet Rule in Force; The Reign of the Strikers Ended in Homestead. Gen. Snowden and the State Troops Take Possession of the Town—No Resistance Offered to the National Guard - - The Carnegie Works Turned Over to the Owners. . . . The Strikers Almost Abject in their Submission." The *Times* described the level of military occupation of the area: "Soldiers on both sides of the Monongahela River, armed with Gatling guns and Springfield Rifles. . . . There is a picket line clear around the town and far up and down the river, while sharpshooters and artillerymen occupy every point commanding the river and the approaches to the town."[134] The number of troops in Homestead would be significantly reduced by the end of July, with the Eighth Regiment, the City Troop of Philadelphia, the Fourteenth Regiment of Pittsburgh, the Ninth and Fifteenth Regiments would be ordered home.[135] The last contingent of the militia left Homestead on October 13, 1892.[136] Historian David Montgomery has said that while "community solidarity sustained the Homestead strikers. . . . What conquered that community was military force brought in from the outside—first unsuccessfully in the form of hired armed guards, and then irresistibly in the form of soldiers ordered in by Governor Robert Pattison."[137]

At the time the National Guard of Pennsylvania was assuming undisputed control over matters in Homestead, the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives had come to

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[133]*New York Times,* July 13, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 135

[134]*Ibid.* 136

[135]*New York Times,* July 27, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 183

[136]Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 183.

[137]David Montgomery, *Afterword,* in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 226.

Pittsburgh and Homestead to hold hearings on the events of July 6. That committee, already investigating the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, was especially concerned about the use of Pinkertons at Homestead on July 6. When Chairman of the committee, Congressman Oates returned to Washington, D.C. on July 15, he reported to his colleagues the extent of the committee's interviews, including those with Frick, Potter, and workmen, amounting to what he described as an "immense amount of testimony." Oates categorized Frick as "a remarkably cunning fellow and a great manager." Frick, he said, "has one of the brightest lawyers [Philander C. Knox] I have ever met." Regarding the labor leaders, he viewed them as "of intelligence and capacity," and the workmen, he said, "as a body are very able and shrewd, certainly the most intelligent lot of manual workers I have ever seen." When asked if he thought there would be further trouble, Congressman Oates replied: "Yes, yes, I do, more trouble and bloodshed, and a great deal of it. The workmen are not acting on impulse. They are pursuing a course dictated by their calm judgment. Legally they do not claim to be right, but morally they think they are." Oates said that non-union men probably armed, would soon be introduced under military protection. He predicted that on the withdrawal of the troops the trouble would be renewed.[138] A U.S. Senate Committee, also investigating the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, visited Homestead November 23, 24, 1892, taking numerous testimonies. Neither the House Report or the Senate Report, both released in February 1893, recommended any federal legislation.[139]

With the military in control around Homestead and the Homestead Steel Works turned over to the company, the mills were operating in a limited sense by July, but with non-union workers. The company let it be known that individual applications for employment at the Homestead works would be received until July 21, and that all of the former employees, except forty who had played a lead role in the strike and the July 6 episode, were invited to apply. As of the closing date, no striking employees had applied.[140] All was not well in other Carnegie plants in the Pittsburgh area. Sympathy strikes were underway at Duquesne, Beaver Falls, and the Lawrenceville section of Pittsburgh. A Lawrenceville worker spoke well the sentiments of his fellow workers: "We are quitting work to-day with a view of winning the flight which the Carnegie people have made upon the Amalgamated Association, and we will it." "We have got to win this fight," he said, "for if we lose it the backbone of our association will be broken."[141] By early August sixteen hundred men were at work in the Homestead mills, and by September 30, Chairman Frick was declaring that everything at the Homestead mills was running nicely, and that the strike was certainly a thing of the past.[142]

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[138]*The Pittsburgh Leader*, July 16, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 145-146. Oates' report, entitled "Labor Troubles at Homestead, PA. Employment of Pinkerton Detectives," *House of Representatives Report No. 2447,* was published in 1893.

[139]Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 180. The Senate hearings were published in U.S. Senate Report No. 1280. Before coming to Homestead, the Senate Committee had taken testimony in Chicago on November 18 of Pinkertons involved in the Homestead incident.

[140]*The Iron Trade Review*, July 21, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 155

[141]*The Pittsburgh Post*, July 15, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 141

[142]*New York Times*, October 1, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 184; Serrin, *Homestead*, 89

In the meantime, Hugh O'Donnell had been trying to bring about a settlement to the strike. On July 17, he traveled to New York where he would meet with national Republican leaders. Within the higher echelon of the Republican party there was considerable concern about recent events at Homestead. One of the individuals with whom he met was Whitelaw Reid, editor and publisher of the New York *Tribune,* who had recently been nominated at the Republican National Convention to be Benjamin Harrison's running mate in the November election. Reid, who was particularly alarmed over the potential impact that Homestead would have, not only on the labor vote, but in giving credence to the Democrats' charge that the Republicans were the party of big business and the high tariff, was receptive to O'Donnell's pleas for assistance in trying to make Andrew Carnegie aware of the concessions the Homestead workers were ready to make to reopen negotiations to settle the strike. Reid suggested that O'Donnell write him a letter, as if he were writing from Homestead, in which he would elaborate on the concessions the workers would make. The heart of the letter O'Donnell wrote to Reid in Reid's New York Office dealt with having the Carnegie Company recognize the Amalgamated Association by re-opening the conference doors, because in O'Donnell's assessment of the situation, there was "no disposition on the part of the employees to stand upon a question of scale or wages, or hours, or anything else. The spirit that dominates them," he wrote, "is conciliatory in the extreme, for they deplore the recent sad occurrence as much as any other class of people in the whole country." He proceeded to ask Reid to do whatever he could in every honorable way to bring about an amicable settlement.

Reid cabled O'Donnell's letter and a message of his own to Carnegie by way of the American Consul General, John C. New, in London. In his message, Reid urged Carnegie "to weigh it most carefully before deciding, for so small a reason as the objection to continued recognition of their organization . . . to prolong this distressing and bloody strife which may spread so widely." Reid received what he thought was a favorable response from Carnegie, again, by way of Consul General New. The essence of the response was that Carnegie had accepted the proposal to negotiate, but that Frick should be consulted. Unknown to Reid was the cablegram Frick had received from Carnegie on July 29: "After due consideration we have concluded Tribune too old. Probably the proposition is not worthy of consideration. Useful showing distress of Amalgamated Association. Use your own discretion about terms and starting."[143]

Assuming that Carnegie was willing to negotiate, but wanted Frick to be consulted, Reid sent his representative for the Republican National Committee, John E. Milholland, to Pittsburgh on July 30 to talk with Frick. When Milholland arrived at the Frick home he found the chairman of Carnegie Steel Company, Limited in a not very receptive mood. He was still recuperating from wounds he had received on July 23, when a Russian anarchist, Alexander Berkman, foolishly thinking he was advancing the cause of labor and particularly that of the Homestead steelworkers, entered Frick's Pittsburgh office, shot him twice in the neck and then stabbed him three times in the hip and legs.[144] Frick emphatically told Milholland that he would never consent to settle the difficulties "if President Harrison himself should personally request him to do so. Notwithstanding the fact that he was a Republican and a warm friend and admirer of the

[143]Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 563-566.

[144]*Ibid.* 562

President." Frick told the representative for the Republican National Committee that he was going to fight the strike out on lines he had laid down even if it took his life itself, and that he was going to "fight this thing to the bitter end. . . It makes no difference," he said, "what Mr. Carnegie has said to [Consul] General New or to anybody else. I won't settle this strike even if he should order me peremptorily to do so." If Carnegie interfered, he asserted, he and all of Carnegie's other managers would resign. While Frick's state of health may have caused his irritability in responding to Milholland, the attack by Berkman did not have any effect on his attitude toward the union, for as Frick himself wrote immediately after the attack, "This incident will not change the attitude of the Carnegie Steel Company toward the Amalgamated Association."[145]The Berkman incident, however, did cause perception problems for the union because of the incorrect assumption on the part of many that there was some connection between Berkman and the AAISW.

Frick's unwillingness to cooperate with the Republican hierarchy did not set well with President Harrison and vice-presidential candidate Reid. The Republicans lost in the run for the presidency, and both Harrison and Reid blamed Homestead for their defeat. Harrison said that he was defeated by "the discontent and passion of the workingmen growing out of wages or other labor disturbances." Chauncey Depew, the toastmaster-general of the G.O.P., laid much of the blame for the Republican defeat directly on the Homestead strike: "As a matter of fact the Homestead strike was one of the most important factors in the presidential contest." Reid, in reflecting a year and a half after the election, was still blaming Homestead: "It was Homestead more than any other agency—I am not sure but it was Homestead more than all agencies combined that defeated us in 1892." In evaluating the role Homestead played in the 1892 Republican defeat, Carnegie's biographer, Joseph Frazier Wall, says that most historians have accepted the strike as a major contributory factor, but "it is highly doubtful that this tragic event was in any way decisive in determining the outcome." Carnegie and Frick, Wall maintains, "served the Republican party as useful scapegoats upon whom to load the burden of its defeat."[146]

When O'Donnell returned to Homestead from his meeting with Whitelaw Reid he learned that the other members of the Advisory Committee strongly disagreed with his trying to cut a deal with the company without involving them and that his continued leadership of the Committee was in serious jeopardy.[147] In fact, O'Donnell was replaced by Thomas Crawford, first on an interim basis, then permanently as chairman leadership at the turn of the century: "He never wanted to know profits," a partner noted. He always wanted to know cost." And when he retired in 1901, he left behind him a youthful, ruthless cadre of junior partners and managers schooled in his spirit, especially on "his insistence on exact information and on rational calculation of alternatives and his method of exploiting subordinates."[148]

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[145]*Ibid.* 566-567.

[146]*Ibid.* 568-569.

[147]*The Pittsburgh Post*, July 27, 1892, in Demarest, "*The River Ran Red,*" 181

[148]David Brody, *Labor in Crisis*, 13-14.

Brody found that steel men, as Wall Street called them, after the strike came to treat labor purely as a production cost, like that of raw materials, handling, production, or shipment, to be narrowed to the irreducible minimum. Frederick Taylor's *Principle's of Scientific Management* (tested primarily at Bethlehem Steel), which rationalized and devalued human individualism more than any work place reform before it in history, would codify and spread through every corner of American industry only a decade later. Brody notes, even worse than this, that in steel, the cost of labor was also made distinct from the cost of production. The steel men divorced wage rates from the cost of productivity so that even as profits rose when costs fell, only the owners realized the profits. Conversely, if the price of raw materials fell, so did the price of steel. In steel then, the rules and benefits of the free market only extended as far as the steel men themselves despite their claims to the contrary.

The measure of productivity was a Carnegie theorem before 1892. The effect of the Homestead strike in terms of union ability to protect workers from wage cuts and hard driving employment, however, was immediate and severe. Between 1890 and 1910, steel making costs fell, Brody's research revealed, almost 25 percent. Also by 1910, 30 percent of steel workers worked a seven day week. Nearly 75 percent worked a 12-hour day. The vast majority of skilled labor positions had been eliminated in favor of mechanized production and unskilled and semiskilled labor. This savings was achieved largely at the expense of labor rather than other production cost cuts. As long as costs alone determined profits, and the cost of labor viewed as a mainspring of achieving "efficiency" a profound animus would exist not only against trade unionism, but against each individual worker in the industry as well. The never ending supply of immigrant, black and other hungry workers more than anything else meant these workers were also disposable. The Homestead blacklisting proved this and the continued use of black lists in industry until the 1930s confirm the power of capital over workers until the formation of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in 1936.

The post-Homestead Strike situation also pitted Carnegie Steel, which controlled 60 percent of the industry by 1900, against the other major steel firms. Carnegie's relentless search for reduced Costs greatly pressured less efficient producers as well as his own shop floor workers. In the depression years of the 1890s, Carnegie was willing to sell steel at prices below the cost of production if it meant destroying competition, buying their mills at reduced prices and acquiring a larger market on a permanent basis. J.P. Morgan, who also held some interests in big steel, saw the destructive nature of Carnegie's ability and ruthless pricing. He determined to "establish a community of ownership or unified control over great industries as the only available means of restraining destructive competition." His goal, allowing capital to continue to thrive in a united and pacified industry, came to fruition when he purchased the Carnegie interests and established. Judge Elbert Gary as the head of U.S. Steel.

Gary and Morgan used both the Homestead strike and destructive pricing to convince Washington officials of the necessity of consolidating the industry. Washington officials threatened intervention based on the Sherman Antitrust Act when Carnegie and Morgan created US steel in 1901. In the relentless warfare of the 1890s, Gary argued, wages were cut to the bone and "strikes among the men were frequent." The maintenance of profits, in his eyes, would mean that "labor relations could be placed on a happier basis" and the goal of creating a "community of interest between proprietors and wage earners" could be achieved. Gary's and Morgan's

highly publicized intentions to create trust between classes was actually a way to get around the Antitrust Act. So thoroughly convincing to regulatory officials was the logic, which turned the intent of the Sherman Act on its head, that U.S. Steel officials were able to codify trust like behavior by steel's industrial elite in a practice called "fair competition," regular meetings of the industry's leaders to set steel prices, the cost of raw materials, production practices, and labor policies, even as President Theodore Roosevelt, the "Trust Buster" held reign.[149]

Part of the broader plan created by post-Homestead steel barons called for new, welfareistic policies intended to alter the visible relation between worker and employer designed to hold workers to the will and prerogative of management. In 1903 U.S. Steel announced the first of a series of new practices designed to bring workers into the fold of future success of the industry. This was a profit sharing plan in which employees could pay for preferred stock out of small deductions from payroll. At the time, it was a momentous innovation and Morgan congratulated its architect, George Perkins, for the "cleverness, wisdom, and justice of the scheme…. It is a big step…towards mitigating the difficulties and dangers of the Capital versus Labor question." In 1915, so many workers held stock that Perkins asked Gary if it was not time to put a worker on the board of the corporation. They settled instead for "inviting some worker 'who has done something…of signal importance to the Corporation's interest. The large intent of having workers view themselves as partners to capital was well established, if not its realization. The stock option program was premised not only on the non-union open shop, and also on the maintenance of popular, powerful ideological overtones which bolstered corporate power in the name of individual liberty, especially the defense of personal liberty and the Horatio Alger myth that any hard working soul, in America could get rich and be happy. Similarly, a workers' annual bonus plan, introduced shortly thereafter and again in the form of stock, not cash, reinforced the recalcitrant nature of individual workers in the industry. The goal, notes Brody, was to "give workers cause for fidelity and industry and…reason for gratitude to the company. Gary, on the heels of the stock option and bonus plans, made it an industry wide practice to make available low interest loans for the purchase of homes or to offer company housing for rent on good terms. Workers benefited from improved housing—Homestead (or more accurately the Borough of Munhall) was an immediate, large-scale beneficiary community of the program—and U.S. steel benefited from the *quid pro quo* the agreement provided. Successful, the program was expanded industry wide in the 1890's, 1900s and 1910s. Workers whose mortgages and family futures were held by the firms they worked for simply did not find the emotional wherewithal to go out on strike. By World War One corporate paternalism was a standard of American industry throughout the manufacturing communities of the United States, especially in large oligopolized industries such as steel, auto, rubber, and electrical manufacturing. Only when the programs were cut, in the early years of the Great Depression, would workers find widespread and long term common cause with each other instead of their employers.[150]

Melvyn Dubofsky, a labor historian who recently assessed the cumulative work in the field to better understand the relationship between labor and government in the broad perspective, also looked at the significance of the Homestead strike. Early in his seminal work *The State and*

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[149]Brody, *Ibid.* 22.

[150]David Brody, *Steel Workers in America, the Non-Union Era*

Labor in Modern America he discusses Homestead, noting that both the U.S. House and Senate sent investigating committees to the strike torn community, that the strike "intruded" on the presidential election of that year, and that the troops were used to end the strike in favor of the company. His conclusion about these events was that working people came to have solid evidence that Republicans were scarcely the friends of labor (Dubofsky, in fact, quotes Carnegie on Cleveland's presidential victory: "Cleveland victory! Well we have nothing to fear and perhaps it is best…. Cleveland is a pretty good fellow.") The strike set a precedent for government's intervention in labor relations and a standard for oppression of workers' political and economic interests for succeeding generations. Cleveland's use of federal troops to break the Pullman strike in 1894 confirmed the ascendancy of capital while Progressive's efforts to moderate the inherent labor-management conflict in America, by the steel men and government officials alike marked the end of *laissez faire* labor relations. Homestead presented the beginning of reform and accommodation designed to both quell and subjugate militant unionists.[151]

The legacy of the Homestead strike overshadowed federal intervention and legislation in labor relations for many years. In 1902 President Roosevelt intervened in a strike in the anthracite industry. In order to avoid more spontaneous mine wars as well as the organized violence at Homestead, he forced anthracite operators to arbitration. During World War One, President Wilson nationalized the railroads, in large part to appease angry and hostile rail workers, but mostly because recalcitrant operators refused to admit to the need for accommodation of both workers and the federal war effort. These instances, while of national importance, were nonetheless industry and issue specific. Not until the New Deal and mass production unionism would workers again be able to achieve control of local government and union recognition as a part of daily life.

The significance of the Homestead strike to the larger patterns of American social history then, by theme, time and place, is extraordinary, especially when placed in the context of the strikes that occurred both before and after 1892. While the worker's battle victory in the heart of the steel industry is noble, their repression afterwards is not. The strike lowered the bar for the use of troops in behalf of corporations, community citizen's representation in local politics, workers' shop floor control of production, and the expectation that government at any level would act in behalf of an individual workers or collective bargaining for generations of American workers. This is the significance of events at Homestead.

Verbal Boundary Description:

The Battle of Homestead site consist of tax parcels

[151]Dubofsky, *The State and Labor in Modern America*, University of North Carolina Press, 1994, 21-24.

Verbal Boundary Description:

The Battle of Homestead site consist of tax parcels 179-A-5 and 179-A-30 as recorded in the Allegheny County Registry of Deeds. Additionally, the nominated area consists of the plain of the Monongahela River directly north and adjacent to these parcels. This area extends 150 feet from the river wall and shore northward. The boundary continues 150 feet northward from a point where the river's edge meets the east side of the CSX Railroad right-of-way. The boundary co-joins the Railroad right-of-way. At 150 feet north of the river's edge, the boundary turns east. It runs approximately 725 feet from the CSX Railroad right of way to a point opposite the eastern edge of the previously identified tax parcels. The boundary then turns south and rejoins tax parcels 179-A-5 at its north east corner.

Boundary Justification:

The Battle Site contains the area of direct engagement between Pinkerton Detectives and the public of Homestead on July 6, 1892. It includes the specific location where the barges were moored as well as that part of the bluff where workers set up barricades. Extant resources associated with the site when the battle occurred are included within the nominated property. Extant resources not meaningfully engaged in the conduct or outcome of the battle have been excluded. The Battle Site edges are defined by the terrain and resources still visible at and near the battle site. On the west, a multispan railroad bridge across the river, locally called the Pemickey Bridge, (excluded) demarcated the edge of the battle site. The bridge was not an important or effective point of control during the battle though it is highly visible in images of the battle. The eastern edge of the battle site was defined by a slight river contour and landscape grade that took the river's edge out of direct sight of the participants on the ground above the barges. The northern boundaries encompass the high ground and mooring area used by participants during the siege of the barges.